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	<b>WG 1</b>		<b>WG 6 (1-B)</b>	
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2	Marta De La Red Montes (SP)		2 Javier Gomez (SP)	
3	Patricia López Henares (SP)		3 Johannes Visser (NL)	Group Speaker
4	Luis Alfonso Cabrera (SP)		4 Carlos Galan Gutierrez (SP)	
5	Filipa Florença Gonçalves (PO)		5 Luis Santana (PO)	
6	Ayako Kobayashi (FR)	Group Speaker	6 Florence Vu Van (FR)	
7	Quinten de Bodt (BE)	Total WG 1	7 Jasper Vrydag (BE)	Total WG 6
8	Ippolito Francesco (IT)	8	8 Francesco Maria Brudaglio (IT)	8
	<b>WG 2</b>		<b>WG 7 (2-B)</b>	
1	Pedro Miguel Casado Casero (SP)		1 Asterio Mira Rodriguez (SP)	
2	Elena Redondo Leiva (SP)		2 Omar Queipo (SP)	
3	Javier Martinez Gonzalez (SP)		3 Rita Viana (PO)	Group Speaker
4	André Rodrigues (PO)		4 Helder Lourenço (PO)	
5	Guillaume Girard (FR)		5 Philippe Dohet (FR)	
6	Alexandra Praet (BE)	Total WG 2	6 Fanny Randanne (FR)	Total WG 7
		6	7 Rianne Van Rossum (NL)	7
	<b>WG 3</b>		<b>WG 8 (3-B)</b>	
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5	Cesar Rodrigues (PO)	Total WG 3	5 Aurélien Seguin (FR)	Total WG 8
		5	6 Giulio Villano (IT)	6
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4	Nuno Alves (PO)		4 Margarida Pimenta (PO)	
5	Steven Segers (BE)		5 Frederik Van Lokeren (BE)	Group Speaker
6	Beatrice Guillaumin (FR)		6 Daniel Colijn (NL)	
7	Arianna Abbasciano (IT)	Total WG 4	7 Stefania Abbasciano (IT)	Total WG 9
8	Alberto Brudaglio (IT)	8	8 Ilenia Casieri (IT)	8
	<b>WG 5</b>		<b>WG 10 (5-B)</b>	
1	Angel Rodriguez (SP)		1 Francisco Vega (SP)	
2	Luis Sousa de Macedo (PO)		2 Vicente Mena Utrilla (SP)	
3	Guillermo Nuncio (PO)	Group Speaker	3 Paulo Silva (PO)	
4	Bastien Fricot (FR)		4 André Filipe Ismail (PO)	
5	Pieter Rademakers (NL)		5 Edouard Simon (FR)	Group Speaker
6	Hester Torn (NL)	Total WG 5	6 Hendrika Francyna Van Alphen (NL)	Total WG 10
7	Riccarda Elena Scaringella (IT)	7		6
	2º Lieutenants Infantry Academy			TOTAL
	Militaries			69
			1 without WG (Leandro Caldas PO)	Total 70

	<b>LIST OF TOPICS</b>				<b>WG,s</b>
	<b>1. Reflections on the future of Europe and its defense.</b>				<b>WG,s 1 &amp; 6</b>
	<b>2. Public information on security and defense issues.</b>				<b>WG,s 2 &amp; 7</b>
	<b>3. European Defense Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) challenges.</b>				<b>WG,s 3 &amp; 8</b>
	<b>4. The importance of the Mediterranean area for the EU.</b>				<b>WG,s 4 &amp; 9</b>
	<b>5. The future of the European society. Risks and opportunities.</b>				<b>WG,s 5 &amp;10</b>

**Working Group 1**

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# THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND ITS FUTURE

## *Introduction*

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The future of Europe and its defense is at the core of discussions within the major political and social spheres of the continent.

In this paper, we try to identify security threats which could manifest themselves upon the European Union after selection we retained six threats which each will be treated in a small chapter. In those chapters we will give a brief summary about those threats. We also try to put forward solutions and a short exploration of the required capabilities to meet those future challenges.

In the first part, we analyse and discuss contemporary political, economical and security scenarios of the European Union and provide solutions to the future. In the second part, we examine the need and importance to have a strategic relationship with other countries in the frame of the European External Actions mentioning China. The possible conflicts which could rise in the Arctic due to the melting of the polar ice will be treated in the third chapter. In this chapter we will also examine the role that the EU should play and what capabilities it should have to play this role. Then, we analyse the consequences of the Yugoslavian war and also the necessary requirements that this region should achieve to their integration in the EU, we focus on the political aspects.

What the next question will be is how the Atalanta mission will change in Somalia after 2014 when the countries get their forces out of this region and the solutions of it.

The north of Africa after the Arab Spring presents a large number of threats and challenges. It is time to look back south to deal with the instability in the region because it may affect the safety of Europe.

## *Europe; Present and Future*

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The future of Europe and its defense raises questions that embrace different areas of the European project. In its beginnings, economic development and long term peace was the primordial resolution to the then European leaders. Nowadays, this achievement that the European citizens had experienced has led to the increased asymmetries between member states, as noticed by the lack of concrete results emanated by the actual European bodies. Contrary as ambitious in the forties and the fifties, Europe hasn't reached the so required stability and economic, political and security solutions are much in need.

In 2008, the world saw the initial stages of the financial crises. Europe and its leaders weren't prepared for the consequences of a situation that came from the other side of the Atlantic. As time passed Euro zone incapacity revealed issues in providing political and economical consensus solutions to the financial crises that have already reached the old continent. Furthermore, three member-states, Greece, Ireland and Portugal suffer an economical intervention from the Central European Bank and the International Monetary Fund proving once more the inefficiency of the Euro.

Politically, Europe has been suffering a deficit in democratic legitimacy because most of its citizens don't identify themselves with the politicians that are seated in Brussels, Strasbourg and Frankfurt. In addition, the reemergence of a hierarchical power between the state members and the reason of the present European Union advocate the urgency to rethink the union.

In the nineties, the Clinton's Administration announced the intention of implementing a Security Sharing. This "threat" leads to an unexpected development between two opposing state members, France and United Kingdom, that unlocked the improvement of European Policy of Security and Defense. Nine years later the Treaty of Lisbon renamed to Common Policy of Security and Defense but constrains of it have been undermining her appliance. Two strategic concepts, the European Strategy of Security (ESS) in 2003 and the Report on the implementation of ESS in 2008, agreed on a political consensus regarding the internal and external threats and the way to solved them.

After this explanation, the question that is raised is how to construct a better future to the European Union on a time that eurocepticism is escalating? The answer is cooperation throughout the Union. Economy, politics and security are interconnected more than ever. The financial-economical crises raised the problem of managing the way Europe is seen internally and internationally and the response to it is a broader understanding between the state-members. Moreover, the future of European security has been explain by the pool and sharing concept which advocates the sharing and reunion of projects and initiatives of militaries capabilities among the member-states. Ultimately, the future of Europe needs a "new beginning" where economy and security are cooperative as one whereas integration depends on the solution to reverse the democratic issues and on its ambition to congregate different cultures and countries.

### *Threats towards the European Union from Asia/Pacific Region*

#### *- China -*

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#### **China and the EU**

Now in this part, we examine possible threats coming form the Asia/ Pacific region, which is economically and politically one of the most contested and active areas in the world. The Pacific Ocean, the waters around the Eurasian continent are turning into a single maritime ringway that gets ever more contested. It is in the Pacific Corridor that maritime disputes seems most threatening, but for the European Union it would be a mistake to get involved in those new Asian power plays. Instead, it should prioritize the Middle Corridor, the perilous sluiceway that that connects the Indian Ocean with the Near East, the pier to the Middle East and Central Asia. Amongst the countries which compose this region, China is always worth being considered tention maker in this regin and in the international community. For example, some surmised that China might cut off our trade lines in case of a conflict and that Europe therefore needs to collaborate with the United States. China's political norms were starting to affect Western values and the impact of countries like China on Europe's strategies. Besides, China's economic and military development are also making influence in Europe. How should treat the European Union China ?

As the world's largest developing country, China enjoys a huge market potential and abundant human resources, and it is advantageously placed in receiving international transfers of industries and technologies. At the same time we see some problems about the violation of copyright and African affairs coming from this development. China's behavior in Africa has illustrated that different political norms are actively used as a source of influence in competition with other powers. Besides, China's manoeuvrability in making compromises on trade disputes and the discussion over China's undervalued currency.

### **Possible solution**

China is making hard questions towards the European Union, but the EU can also take several advantage from this emerging new country. Therefore what we need is a strategic cooperation with China. But we can say that a strategic partnership between the EU and China is not materializing, either on paper, or in practice. The Sino-European relationship is by no means an enduring strategic axis. The EU could benefit from such a strategic alliance with China, but it has failed to seize this opportunity. It seems that the Sino-European partnership begs for more realism, not for idealism. There are sufficient shared strategic interests to underpin a more realist relationship. Realism will also make relations less prone to setbacks over symbolical issues, permit Europe to reap larger gains from other powers, and form a worthy alternative for the EU's defective soft power. While realism might help to strengthen EU-China relations, the challenge is to deal with the EU's internal realpolitik as well. Europe and China recognize the need for stability and peaceful co-operation. Yet, China's involvement with multilateralism and its diplomatic manoeuvring on problem states prove its preference for realism.

Departing from a detailed overview of various international issues ranging from Iran to climate change, it criticized the European Union for lacking coherence in approaching China, warned that inflating the Sino-European agenda without producing tangible outcomes added to a mutual expectation gap, and urged for more realism in the EU's policy making. EU's China policy should therefore depart from a rand bargain that includes the interests of all Member States and allows them to hammer out larger profits than they could have done bilaterally with China. We need a reform concerning the external action service, that means internal cohesion. Several of Chinese experts and officials emphasize the fact that the EU is facing a severe internal and external legitimacy crisis.

### *The Arctic area*

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The melting of the polar ice will have serious strategically implications for the European Union and the rest of the world. Under the polar ice there are great reserves of natural resources like gas, oil, fish, fresh water and minerals. Exploiting those resources will decrease the dependence upon the Middle East and for some states Russia concerning energy supply therefore Arctic nations are claiming extensions on their exclusive economical zone (EEZ) by claiming submarine ridges. In 2007 a Russian submarine planted a flag on the Lomonosov ridge claiming an extension of the Russian EEZ. Another way to claim extensions of the EEZ is through a military presence in the claimed region. In the Arctic this has not happened yet but EU strategists should consider this possibility.

Another implication of the melting will be the new sea lines of communication (SLOC) that will go through the arctic area. Some countries already are taking measures to play a more important role in the Arctic. Russia for example is building new corvettes for coastal defense and search and rescue purposes. China is also expressing interest in the Arctic area. China is building new icebreakers for missions in the Arctic and acquired an observer status in the Arctic council.

The Kingdom of Denmark is the only EU country which has Arctic claims. The EU should support Denmark in acquiring a stronger position in the Arctic because the reserves will give the EU more

independence on resources and free trade through the Arctic area will lead to considerable savings for shipping companies which will lead to a decrease of consumer prices. The EU should also play a role in developing Search and Rescue (SAR) agreements in the Arctic. This is important because Russia lacks at this moment the required infrastructure to deliver an efficient SAR service in this region. The best platform to achieve this goal is the Arctic Council but at this stage the EU does not have an observer status in the Council. The EU should make a priority of acquiring this status by settling the trade disputes with Canada, which can be done at the North Atlantic free trade conference or when Iceland would join the EU the EU can exercise more pressure for the observer status.

Finally it is important to look at the military dimension of the Arctic problem. The Russians foresaw in 2009 the possibility for a conflict in the Arctic and the EU should do the same. If such a conflict should occur in the near future the EU will be capable to meet the threat because the Russian armed forces are on a level of the nineties. The Northern fleet comprises old submarines like the Kilo, Akula, Delta IV,... and Kirov class cruisers. If a conflict should occur a coalition of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are likely to be sufficient for countering the threat in the North. The Scandinavian countries should then focus on the Baltic Sea. The problem is that the EU is shifting towards a Human Security doctrine and the capabilities required for those missions are not the anti-aircraft, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities that are needed to meet this more conventional but not unlikely threat of the future.

### *The Balkans*

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The Yugoslav Wars are conflicts that were developed between 1991 and 2001, resulting in two sets of successive wars that were affected by the six former Yugoslav republics. These conflicts were due largely to ethnic diversity and different cultures, as well as political and economic causes. The result was the separation between Serbs on one side and Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians on the other side.

The main consequences of these conflicts were:

- Massive economic disruption
- Permanent instability.
- Poverty of virtually all former Yugoslav territory.

Following this conflict the current situation is as follows: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia could be potential candidates to join the European Union, however, is not possible until they have fulfilled the requirements for membership of the Union European. These requirements are:

In the first place, in Albania it is necessary, among other things, a properly functioning Parliament, amendments to electoral legislation, appointment of an ombudsman, holding elections that are appropriate in relation to European and international standards, and finally, a large number of judicial reforms.

In the second place, Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although it was granted the status of an EU candidate country in December 2005, progress has been slow in terms of the political criteria,

particularly the rule of law. Consequently, we see in this case, political relations would be the first thing that should be improved.

In the third place, in Kosovo, the main problem lies in the lack of stability, which has tried to combat by the EU, since the countries of this consider that Kosovo has a clear European perspective. That is why we have named:

- An EU special representative for Kosovo.
- The mission of the EU Rule of Law (Eurlex).
- The liaison office of the Commission.

In the fourth place, regarding Montenegro, the requirements to be met are the modification of the electoral law and adoption of measures to improve the fight against corruption and organized crime.

In the fifth place, Serbia is a potential candidate country for EU membership, however this requires the establishment of a cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, a prerequisite for Serbia to form portion thereof.

Finally, about Croatia, accession negotiations started in 2005 and has finally joined the EU on July the 1st.

All these requirements to which we have referred are regulated under Title V of the TEU, particularly in the Arts. 216, 217 and under Art.207 Art.218 TFUE. Therefore, the main objective would be marked for the integration of these countries would be possible to achieve political stability, economic development, and ultimately promote peace between them.

The **instruments** used by the EU to make this possible, among others, are:

- A process of stabilization and association, which establishes a framework for relations between the countries of the Western Balkans and the EU.
- Improved regional cooperation through the Regional Cooperation Council and the Free Trade Agreement Central Europe.
- Encouraging contact among citizens through cross-border cooperation without visas.

### *Atalanta*

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#### **Description**

The European Union is concerned with the piracy of Somali -based and armed robbery at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.

Pirates, the criminals of this area try to take control of vessels transiting Risk Areas in the Region and taking money for the crew, the cargo and vessel. Part of it is cost by illegal fishing, and according to teh World Bank it has cost an estimated \$7 to \$18 billions.

As a result, in December 2008 the EU launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation **Atalanta** within the framework of the European Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law in response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery.

### **Mission in this days**

Thanks to this mission piracy on this region has been reduced. In early 2011, the figure was 758; currently, 71 sailors are being held hostage by pirates.

But the main reason for the reduction of hijackings on the sea seems to be that ships are now far better defended against attacks.

Armed guards, now carried by more than 60% of vessels, have been essential in discouraging them. Other thing that could be happening is that their business model is changing to kidnap foreign aid-workers and tourist on land. But for sure Navies patrolling the are from EU task-forces are also co-operating better and acting more aggressively which is making it a much secure area.

### **Where the problem goes**

But all of this is “fragile and reversible”, like Jon Huggins, director of Oceans Beyond Piracy, an American NGO said.

We must have in mind that the suppression of piracy needs to be combined with better onshore government and deterrence.

In 2014 forces from the EU and NATO will receive the mandate of end this mission and pirates are probably just waiting for their opportunity to come back, that is why the EU should cooperate with the Somali government and their armed forces to eradicate the problem. For the same reason naval forces are cooperating with near countries to contain pirates.

Their activities usually wane from May to September, but they could act at autumn as well.

Right now pirates' attacks are down at least 75% and we should know that not a single ship that that has employed armed security has ever been hijacked, but many others solutions were effective like training crew and posting lookouts.

## *North Africa*

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### **Threat**

It is true to say that in this moment, the most commented threat is the one that comes from the region of the north of Africa. Talking of this we can found to diferent regions, with diferent problems but with relation between them. We are talking about the Magreb and the Sahel.

The Magreb is a region composed by Mauritania, Marroco, Argelia, Tunisia, Libia and the Occidental Sahara (the is nowadays claimed by the Moroccan). After the arab spring we have not only moments for the hope but also for the uncertainty. Up to this moment the governements of Tunisia and Libia has fallen, and there are riots and protests in other countries.

It seems that democratic values has touch the north of africa, but Yihadism and radical Islamists, who are not confident with that values, are taking advantage of this and step by step they are getting more power and influence in the region. Furthermore after the legitimate intervention in Libya the allies failed to ensure the impermeability of the southern borders of Libya, in order to prevent

smuggling of Gaddafi's military arsenal. This fell into the hands of insurgent groups in the Sahel, which has allowed them to reset the attack in northern Mali.

This brings us to a situation that has sparked a "monster" a few miles of our southern border, in the Sahel, the area under Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. In this desert area and countries such as Mali, Mauritania and Niger rampant not only bandits of all kinds, gangs and tribes struggling to gain control of the area, but that Al Qaeda is increasingly powerful in a region of weak governments and permanent instability that can affect Europe in many ways.

There are also economic and financial challenges, because the Sahel is still a region rich in raw materials and energy products, well managed, could ensure the prosperity of these nations and their peoples.

### **Solution**

The different problems in these regions need different strategies to solve the problems. In the area of the Magreb the UE must cooperate very close to with the old and the new regimes. As it is a political and economical crisis these countries need our support to help them to maintain their governance and to facilitate understanding between the people and the government without the need of military help.

The Sahel area is more difficult because their countries do not have strong governments. Nowadays the EU do not have the resources to maintain a great number of stabilization operations, that could be the perfect solution in order to establishing and maintaining the three pillars of stabilization: security, governance and development. So may be, the best solution is to cooperate with the government and improve our intelligence gathering in the ground and if it is necessary act surgically with special operations units in critical points. The Sahel can not become the refuge of radical Islam and violence, because of its stability depends on European security and progress of the countries of the region

### *Conclusion*

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Europe's future depends on its ability to cooperate with others in order to establish itself as a credible actor in the international system. The financial crisis that arose in the last years has proved political and security that the member-states have problems in reaching a unanimous consensus. The response to this issue is a new start to the European Union. However, other threats from different geographical spectrums impose new challenges that demand urgent response.

It seems that Chinese affairs can be positive for the EU if we change the point of view. What we need is how realistic we think and take a strategic partnership for the benefits of the EU and for that we need an internal reform as well. In order to treat international affairs, we have absolutely to take Chinese cooperation.

If we look at the Arctic the EU must recognize that it has the potential of becoming one of the serious issues of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The EU has to play a constructive role while they back Denmark up. The EU should also be prepared for a military conflict and for this reason it is imperative that the EU keeps a capable fleet with classical warfare capabilities.

The Balkans need a restructuring of the political and economic system, which should start in their own territory, and be performed by their own politicians ahead of a possible accession of those territories in the EU, without rejecting the idea that these territories later aided by member countries

of the EU. All of this is because many of these countries have great potential to integrate into the EU.

At the Atalanta mission the EU must do some changes if we want to eradicate piracy from the Somali region, the only way to do this is to cooperate with the government of Somalia and to help their military forces until they can solve this problem alone, because if we do not do that pirates will just be waiting for their opportunity to come back.



# V EUROPEAN EURODEFENSE CONFERENCE

## Public information on security and defense issues

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## **1. Introduction**

Within the European Union member states military operations are getting less understanding of the citizens. When people are asked of ideas to cut the budget during hard times in the economic crisis, the Ministry of Defense is mentioned as a department which could easily save money. For military operations, the public opinion is very important. Not only for the support and respect for our men and women who are deployed abroad, but also to prevent political issues when operations are finished. Furthermore, the right public information can be used to win a war, but a lack of understanding of, or a lack of information to the national parliaments or citizens, can work against a nation state.

Besides the fact that citizens can choose for the ‘wrong’ media to gather their information from, communications officers of governments or Ministries of Defense are not exposing their information at all the places where information is provided. In other words, it is very hard for citizens to know what our military forces are working on and therefore you cannot blame the citizen for a lack of understanding in military operations.

A well informed society is at the basis of a democratic state, it is an objective of social justice and the welfare of its citizens. Mass media information has the power to influence and even change the opinion of its audience, sometimes a whole country or even the opportunity to change the worldwide information.

This paper will discuss to what extent citizens are informed about military operations of the national forces and how it can influence public opinion and in the end: policy decisions. In some European countries the lack of, or the wrong information to the citizens, it has led to political consequences. How can public information be used as a weapon to win the public opinion?

In order to answer this question, we will elaborate on examples in which we can consider the public opinion as an enemy for the military operations, and when and how governments can use the public opinion as a weapon to make a military operation work. Finally, this paper will propose ideas on governments and Ministries of Defense on how to use public information as good as possible as a weapon.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

First of all it is important to distinguish the concept of 'public information'. The concept of information reports to any data, happening or knowledge that is transmitted in the form of a message. It makes also sense to explain here the concept of communication. According to Hartmut Bühl, communication is the delivery of a message with the objective of achieving a subjective desired result. Many times the concept of information is wrongly confused with the communication concept.

## **3. Public information as an enemy for the state**

It is important that states value the significance of a good communication with their citizens, but it is especially so when it comes to subjects relating security and defense. In order to make the public opinion understand the reasons that lie behind the decisions that are being taken and why are they important. Only by paying attention to this issue will we have a feedback situation in which the population and the state powers understand each other.

But this seems to be an ideal case, unfortunately there are many examples in which there are misconnections between society and their political powers as well as leaks of information that give the population data they were not aware of and that can force a political change, drastic or not, in the strategies the government had elaborated.

Sometimes it is a matter of states not being able to communicate efficiently their actions or policies to the masses, others, states face challenges relating leaks of classified data to the press or internet.

The first case, states not being able to communicate with their citizens in a capable manner, seems to differentiate between democratic and non-democratic countries. The first ones do not need the support of the masses to maintain the political structure in the same way the second type do, because their reliance in the public opinion is based in the existence of periodic elections. Because of this fact, the implications of a communication failure for the political powers is much more destructive. There are some examples in recent history of governments falling due to miscommunications with their population, scandals or similar issues.

In line with the afore mentioned, we can point out some examples in the context of the European Union that show clearly the consequences that a government can suffer if they do not pay attention to the public's perception.

### 3.1 Iraq

First of all, we would like to address the example of the intervention in Iraq in 2003, carried out by several European countries. In this particular example there was a lack of understanding between the citizens and their governments that led to protests in some cases, as it is the Spanish case, and political consequences in others, such as the falling of the Blair or Balkenende governments.

Let us elaborate more, on the start of the political process of the war in Iraq some European countries provided military support to the United States believing the statements that were being made since 2002 that informed about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the country (Britain publishes dossier outlining the threat posed by Iraq. It includes the “45 minute claim” that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which could be used within 45 minutes of him giving an order)<sup>1</sup>. Since there were not definitive proofs of the existence of said weapons, the population in some countries reacted in negative manner when they knew government’s intention to deploy their troops in Iraq.

Protests took place for weeks, and a social movement was created in Spain to raise awareness among the citizens and in order to stop this governmental resolution. But this was not the situation in every country, as this type of reaction never took place in countries such as Portugal that also participated in the war.

Subsequently, the governmental parties that were in power when the decision to intervene was taken, started to lose the elections in their respective countries providing a blatant example of the lack of understanding with their citizens. Afterwards the presence of WMD was proven to be inexistent, ratifying the general opinion of the population.

### 3.2 Vietnam Tet Offensive

The following example had taken place in the Vietnam War. The impact of a report had a huge consequence on the result of the war. During January–February 1968 the forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam launched an assault on all American bases and facilities in South Vietnam. It was called the Tet Offensive. At that time the journalist Walter Cronkite journeyed to Vietnam to cover the aftermath of this Offensive. In a dinner the US commander of all US forces told Cronkite off the record: *"We cannot win this Goddamned war, and we ought to find a dignified way out."*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> BBC, Iraq profile, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763>

<sup>2</sup> Fromson, M. (2009). "And That's The Way It Was...". *Huffington Post*.

In his TV show the reporter described the real situation in Vietnam, what was not in accordance with what the government was telling the people. His words were:

*“To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.”*

The previous words had a profound effect on the US government and shocked the US public opinion. Before the offensive, the political and military leaders had been assuring the US population that victory was just around the corner, thought that the communist were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive attack. They claimed the enemy was all but destroyed. When the enemy attacked all across South Vietnam in this offensive, it proved that those statements were inaccurate. Faith in the US Government, the war, and the military, went down from there.

There can be different conclusions following this event. We can ask ourselves if reporters really need to be present on the battle field. Because it can affect the turnout of battle and in this case a war. Another inference could be if a journalist got regular briefings about the missions and inform the public. The Vietnamese war wouldn't maybe never held so long and the number of victims wouldn't have been so high.

### *3.3 Terrorist attack Madrid*

The communication management of the 11-M terrorism attacks in Madrid, is one of the greatest exponents in terms of public information concerned. The terrorist attack in the capital left Spain a total of 192 victims. Without comment on political issues arising from the attack, on March 11 2004, it was left a true guide of what should not be done when managing the communication of any democratic government. Any communications textbook, one can find the Ten Commandments in managing any crisis situation. There isn't a doubt about "DO NOT LIE" is among them, so nobody can explain how the government of José María Aznar fell in such as childish mistake.

Crisis management that triggered the attacks showed that the government was not prepared to handle the situation. From early morning, the information released to the media

from the press office of Moncloa pointed to the terrorist group ETA as guilty of the attacks. The mainstream media, Spanish and foreign, collected the information and published it thinking that the data available to the government were true.

The cabinet communications never realized the magnitude of the events, until some point began to teletype foreign jihadist terrorism as a possible author of the slaughter in the capital of Spain. At this time, any prior strategic approach got vanished, and executive problems were growing to Aznar. News from Moncloa began to be diffuse, and even contradictory.

After several press conferences offered, for up to four members of the central executive, along with the pressure attempt made by the Prime Minister to the main communication heads of Spain, provoked a mass society reaction. The contradictions in the statements given, and the fact our country's involvement in the Iraq war, led to the rejection and dissatisfaction with the different versions made public by the central executive, started to give credence to the different information about the authorship of the Islamists in the attacks.

In just three days, the Aznar government caused in society a rejection reaction to any kind of continuity of the Popular Party as ruling formation in Spain. The attempted manipulation on the responsibility for the attacks, the lack of uniformity in the successive statements of the members of the executive and grassroots mobilization of left-wing organizations in Spain, caused the change of government in the elections held just three days after the attacks.

Underestimating the empowerment of society, coupled with the lack of a strategic approach to government communications showed, once again, that in times of crisis, the logic outweighs the attempt to hide the truth, because later, or earlier, this would come out.

Finally note, that in that situation would have been enough to have had a unified message among members of the government, and have appealed to the union, first, the different political forces, and second, of a society that mourned 192 innocent people, because with only three days apart, and sociological data in hand, where the ruling party held a comfortable majority, this would have kept the government position after days lost.

#### **4. Public information as a weapon of the state**

In 1989, Colin Powell advised senior officers at the National Defense University by saying “you can win the battle and lose the war if you don't handle the story right”. Indeed, the person who has the information has the power.

The lack of information can paralyze an army, this is why it's important for each government to possess and step in the reports. We know that information and manipulation remain every war foundations (Goebbels during the second World War or Iranian communication minister during the Sand Storm) and mass media is the most powerful object for legitimize an intervention.

All communications are directed towards targets (European citizen and journalists). In time of war, there are two fronts: battlefields and public opinion. As media has an important influence in the opinion, governments need to keep an eye on and to deliver which information they want to give, especially military information because of economics, social and politics interests. This is clearly a public opinion manipulation, which examples overflow like in Kosovo, Rwanda, or when we supposed there were weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. The most important argument was on these WMDs by showing the state of Iraq as a threat. But after lots of research these weapons were not found. That is a use of the information as a weapon.

During conflicts, media are usually remitted. Appears a locking of information about army's operations by governments which tried to preserve their own interests. In this concept, Mali's warfare is a perfect representation.

Actually, misinformation allows media to discern goods of the wicked. That permits to understand faster the complicated situation and to catch public attention. War can be used also for politics, the last example came from France with the intervention of the French Army in Mali, that was surely necessary but also to assure the situation of the president who had to show his force and his capacity to command and choose fastly.

Moreover, soldiers deployed in the battlefield, have to keep a military reserve duty because information can be used as a tool by others. Thus, only charged – communication officers can reveal news like died soldiers' identities. So, information is a useful weapon, perhaps the best in our society and governments has to use it carefully. Besides, information can be understood with many ways and one of it can create more damages than information in itself.

When governments hide a part of report, most of the time it's because military operations are in a critical stage. This dissimulation by giving the least information as possible is set up to protect hostages and give an exit to kidnappers by dealing with.

Sometimes mediatic bombs are more powerful than material bombs and some war can be loose because of the communication. Social networks - used in Arab Spring - are a perfect illustration of impact strength of information.

Everybody knows that information is a propaganda which is inherent to war. Regardless the situation, there is no objective and unbiased view, but on the contrary, a strong supervision isn't productive.

Enquiry is the fundamental key. Technological improvement allows more complicated system for management of information. Most of all, there is a relation between mediatic interference in the conflict and the support of public opinion.

That is why the army chooses someone to talk to the media and communicate for the defense organization. The information can be right or wrong but it can be used as a weapon. For example, nowadays, the government of Israel is trying to give some arguments to the other western countries and European Union in order to attract them in their war against Palestine and most precisely Gaza. The aim is to show the situation of the country to the other and to try to find there help or just have their statement. The information given by the government was: "60 per cent of our population is under Palestine's fire of missiles, would you want to live a same situation without respond?" The question show how information can help a state to ask for help or show there right of acting like that by making war against Palestine.

From the military point of view there are many things or many information that shouldn't be showed to the population in order to avoid problems like people working in foreign country and his relatives. However military people have to sign documents that engage the author not to reveal classified information to the public in order to protect under-converted people. Thus information can be used as a weapon if it is used by third person.

Nowadays all people can take videos and photos; share it on social networks without control on the truth. In this case information can jeopardize our lives.

Nevertheless, the risk of government's silence and situations' ambiguity is to be perceived as a form of censorship by the public opinion but also to distort the reality and to have a potential criminal behavior.

## **5. Proposal: how to use public information as a weapon?**

European Union member states should use public information more and better as a weapon to get a better understanding of citizens in order to prevent political issues after military operations. How can governments work on a better understanding of the citizens? In order to answer this questions, we've put together several ideas to make citizens more connected and therefore give them a better understanding of their own security.

### **1. Internet; provide a website for militaries**

Internet has about 2.1 billion users, and its availability its even considered by the United Nations as a human right since February 2012.

Social media – Facebook, Twitter, YouTube: It is important for Defense Ministries to have not only a website to inform the population but also profiles in social networks such as the ones afore mentioned, in order to get in contact with young parts of the population and make them aware of the actions that are being carried out.

Websites for information from the field: it could be interesting to have soldiers, once they are back home from their missions, writing blogs about their experiences in the field, what they did, who they helped and telling stories about their stay than can not only inform the population but interest them in the actions that are being carried out, always under the supervision of a person with enough knowledge to stop possible classified information from being spread.

**2. Informative events on military bases:** military facilities should be available to be visited on certain days of the year, by students of primary schools, for example in the age of 6 to 12. The European Commission should support this kind of initiatives and it should learn from the already existing programmes in some European countries.

**3. Add a Defence and Security subject to the curriculum of primary and secondary schools:** In order to make the children aware of Security, Defense and Citizenship issues in an early stadium of their lives.

**4. Add specific courses related to defense and security oriented to journalists:** the curriculum from schools of journalism should contain education on defense and security in order to provide tools for those who will start working in this field.

5. Press Conference by Top Commanders: European Ministries should use the status of a high ranking official to tell the story of the military operations to provide more veracity to what happened on the field. Furthermore, it makes them more visible to the citizens.

## **6. Conclusion**

As a result, we believe that there should be a more structured treatment of the information that is being given to the population, as the 11-M bombings show us, the situations where the institutions try to control the reality and give a perception that does not fit it, the public opinion perceives it, and it ends up affecting the institutions themselves and the trust they hold from the citizenship.

Thus we think that since society has the need of information, the public administrations should provide them with it, and try to be as transparent while doing so as they possibly can, in order to improve their image.

Attention should also be paid to the situations where the institutions do not listen to the opinions of the population, and try to act on reasons that are either not true or not proven. If the public opinion is not in favor of an action it cannot be maintained in the long run, thus it is a necessity nowadays to provide them with the needed explanation.

Also armed forces should try to get more in contact with the population on a regular basis so as to be more visible and the mere contact with society provides a better defense culture among civilian citizens.

Summing up, information nowadays has an immeasurable value and so it cannot be ignored by states and its institutions, namely the military institutions. It's compulsory that our security and defense related institutions build a more pro active and closer relationship with their audience, in this case, the European citizens. In order to also act as proactive citizens we wrote up a survey of proposals that aim to help our institutions to achieve this goal.

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# European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB) Challenges

Working Group 3

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## 1. EUROPEAN SECURITY

Europe is nowadays facing one of the most challenging financial and economic crises in its history that affects its position as one of the most important region in the current geopolitical board. This situation increasingly gets more complex, at a time where changes in the international order and the rise of unconventional menaces pose new threats and new security needs, for which the long term perspectives only announce great difficulties.

For this reason it is imperative for the European Union to maintain an ambitious defence policy, anticipating the threats to European security that might rise in the next few decades, before they become uncontrollable. In the current global scenario, there is a series of challenges and security risks that need to be attended, and for which the European Union should be prepared to provide mid-term responses:

- International terrorism: This is one of the most invisible security threats. Madrid and London attacks caused a commotion on the European society, showing the vulnerability of the Union when preventing this kind of hostile activity. Furthermore, the risks increase due to the proliferation of extremist activity within the European territory, with the possibility of acquisition by such kind of organizations of NBQR (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) capabilities.
- Cyber-attacks: Cyber world is getting more and more important in all Member States societies. Economy, government institutions, business and enterprises, or even the military, these are overly more dependent of digital technology, that makes cyber world a sensitive target for terrorism groups, cyber espionage, organized crime, and other types of disruptive informatics attacks.
- Piracy: The European Union is already fighting against piracy not only in Indic Ocean but also in Atlantic Ocean. This criminal activity, that as shown a massive increase in the last few years, affects to European trade routes between our continent and the rest of the World, specially Africa and Asia. To contain and to eradicate this activity is also a main objective as it is imperative the restoration of normal sea trade activities.
- Regional instability: Conflicts taking place in close-by countries such as Mali, Syria and Libya are also a concern for the stability of European security and defence policies, due to the impact that these events have on European interests, and may require intervention.
- Energy security: Member States are becoming growingly dependent on external countries for the acquisition of energy, namely fossil fuels. This problem requires a great effort in order to ensure the stability of its delivery, which obviously encompasses the stability of the producer states, as well as the security of the supplying network itself.
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): The proliferation WMD in European surroundings is also a main concern for European security, to the extent that the acquisition of such weapons by unstable or even rouge states unbalances the international order, and lights the spectre of their use over our territory.

- Climate changes: This global problem is a risk factor for European population, to the extent that changes on the environment might generate effects in agriculture, economy, and human health, among others.

Moreover controlling all this threats, EU is also performing missions in Africa contributing to world peace.

All these ambitious objectives force the UE to maintain a high technological and industry capabilities, research and development.

## **2. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES**

There are many problems and challenges related to European Defence Industry. The most important ones will be described in the next paragraphs.

All over EU Member States there are plenty of redundancies and duplications, in some of the military capabilities such as “personnel, facilities, and industrial outputs”. For instance, there are seven types of combat helicopter, four types of main battle tank and three types of fighter aircraft. These excesses in the European Defence Industries can overload the European Union Defence budgets without delivering operational benefits. This is a bad situation, and Europe can no longer afford the overcapacity and duplication in having 27 national markets. But this is not a recent problem. Since the post-Cold War that military budget cuts are making this situation worst. This problem is getting even more aggravated since the 2008-2009 financial crises, so something has to be done.

Along the history, European Union Member States have often given priority to political, industrial and economic issues rather than operational needs. As a result of this, the collaborative projects have been affected by time-delays, increasing in the costs and, most important of all, the equipment was not completely able to match operational needs. The added value of the outputs of these projects was not always satisfactory. The Member States have to decide what to choose. There is a paradigm between the military and the population welfare and the decision often tends to pressure the military budget.

In a near Future, if measures are not taken, Europe will be faced by the erosion of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDITB), what will lead to the loss of Europe’s technological leadership in a number of critical areas.

The innovation is very important in what concerns developing EU military capabilities. The innovation is not all about the final product technological development. It concerns the possibility to carry out existing tasks at lower costs and with different solutions and also the business procedures. Again, the problem created by the military vs. welfare paradigm is limitative, because for this kind of innovation it is needed financial support and political support.

There are some clusters, bilateral agreements and cooperation between some Member States of the EU. However, those cooperation clusters are not enough and the Defence Industry continues fragmented all over EU.

The coordination between those clusters is not sufficient. In fact, the bilaterally and multi-laterally agreements have taken part in European countries sharing similar geographic settings or political interests. This regionalisation can prejudice the advance of a military cooperation agreement at the EU level. If we don't be careful with the cooperation coordination, we can generate disjointed armed forces and make the less powerful countries be supported by the security provided by the powerful ones.

The European Union, like the name suggests, is composed by many countries. Each of those countries have their own National Interests. In some of them, the Defence Industry is a very important industry, providing an enormous economical growth and thousands of highly skilled jobs. So, Member States have the intention to maintain the Defence Industries under their borders, leading to a very complex task if we want to integrate the different National Defence industries.

As all of we know, the EU military missions are composed by many different Member States' troops. As a consequence, the interoperability must be granted in order to get an efficient command and control of the combined forces. This is a huge challenge to the EU defence industry and it must be taking in account like a challenge to be overcome by the integration of EU Defence Industry. Public opinion must be changed in order to give more importance to the defence worries. The political decisions are influenced by the public opinion and because of that, the budget for Security is decreasing in all Member States. This is a main concern, because without budget, there must be encountered other types of solution in order to develop the Defence Industries and the EU military capabilities.

It is well known that United States have many technological advances that are not achievable by the EU for the time being. So, this is a problem, because we are dependent of systems like GPS (Global Positioning System) to continue operating and that makes us vulnerable.

### **3. POTENTIAL NEW SCENARIOS**

European Union has to deal with an uncertain future. The world is continuously changing and it is less cooperative and more globalized every year. That is the reason why we have to have in mind several possible scenarios for a long-term timeframe (about 30 years), to help live with uncertainty and respond more effectively and resiliently to those situations that might occur in the future. We can identify several future situations which are the following:

- Scenario 1: Threats to the European Homeland.
- Scenario 2: Critical instability in South- East Asia.
- Scenario 3: Power struggle in the Indo-Pacific.
- Scenario 4: Threats to critical infrastructure overseas.

We have to say that these scenarios do not mean that EU should react and imply to all - or any of them - but if European Union has to be and act like a global player in the future is needed to react to important changes and future events. If we noticed the past and present events: terrorism, Arab Spring, cyber-attacks, cybercrime, maritime piracy, etc. These

scenarios may come to situate a good mental map with and bring along. And, of course, they may also contribute a list of contingencies to have in mind and to be prevented.

#### Scenario 1: Threats to the European Homeland

- Risk/ threat: increasing authoritarian countries on the EU's periphery. Threat to the territory. Also ethno-nationalist elements within the country can mount cyber-attacks on one of the Member States.
- Response: European must provide defence effort, to deter a conventional attack with enough territorial defence, avoiding risks to the Member States.
- Potential contingencies: a lack of European response could be perceived as a weakness and lack of solidarity.
- Requirements: proper defences with capacity to avoid or dissipate attacks from foreign criminals, States, or agents.

#### Scenario 2: Critical instability in South- East Asia

- Risk/ threat: A growing South- East Asia means a disruption of the regional balance power. EU needs to keep growing if it wants to be a global actor.
- Response: Geopolitical instability in a maritime environment means a new naval footprint to uphold regional confidence with permanent and near naval patrols.
- Potential contingencies: natural disaster (volcanic eruption, tsunami), piracy and conflict maritime claims and sovereignty claims of small islands, for example.
- Requirements: strong naval patrols and fleet to deal with careful situations.

#### Scenario 3: Power struggle in the Indo-Pacific

- Risk/ threat: a conflict or struggle in the Indo-Pacific region between the main important countries.
- Response: EU should ensure their most important maritime communication lines. For that a sea command would be needed.
- Potential contingencies: the allies of the States can be involved.
- Requirements: mobilise a large naval fleet with surveillance and anti-submarine and anti-air warfare.

#### Scenario 4: Threats to critical infrastructure overseas

- Risk/ threat: Islamist *jihadist* set up artillery and rocket batteries along the Canal the Suez, they demand taxes from passing determined points.
- Response: to conduct air and naval strikes against *jihadist* and protect infrastructure along all their trade to and from the Middle East and Asia passes.
- Potential contingencies: no allies could develop advanced air defence systems to the *jihadist*.
- Requirements: Europeans would need to disable the anti-ship artillery and rocket batteries along the banks of the Canal, at a range of 6.000 km from their homeland.

As a conclusion, European Union tackles a complicate and unpredictable future, full of complex situations and geopolitical changes. If EU wants to be considered, it needs to reinforce its defence and industrial policy. It is compulsory to be stronger, more unified and cooperative.

## 4. SOLUTIONS

Europe's Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) is about cooperating to meet and overcome its security threats. The assets to deal with the new threats increasingly require state-of-the-art technology, such as in areas of communications and surveillance, and the use of highly mobile and well equipped professional forces. Heavy, expensive, weapons systems such as strategic bombers or heavy tanks, are less and less required in modern European military realm, particularly when it comes to define how many of these elements are after all necessary. On the other hand, all types of weapons systems tend to get more and more expensive as countries' requirements increase, and their technology develops. Therefore, it is essential to maintain the technological edge in sectors such as electronics, space, civil aviation, mechanics, materials tech, etc. *Tech-edge* is the key to the future, and to stay in the both strategic and economic *game of security*. However, all of these tools are expensive, posing great budget constraints on countries willing to keep up with the necessary of modern defence. Also, the North American superiority in this domain, mostly sustained by a defence budget that greatly surpasses the combined European one, contributes to an efficiency-oriented pressure regarding a smart policy of military technological choices.

Hence, to tackle the fragmented nature of Europe's defence market, and to counter the duplication, oversizing, and dispersed funding of essential security technologies, it is our argument that several options should be taken into account:

- To terminate the overcapacity of Europe's industrial base, introducing specialization according to efficiency; (shipyard example) and duplication (tank models example), which is unsustainable.
- To standardize weapons systems by introducing single line models for the main security branches, thusly reducing the expensive and unnecessary duplication of aircraft, tanks, light weapons, and related parts;
- To foster dual-use project programming on both civil and military projects, in order to simplify project management, expenditures, and survivability of the products in the commercial markets;

A strong industrial base, able to develop future capabilities and to play a role in world-wide defence economics, is absolutely essential for Europe. This means staying competitive, and to produce products of various security related sectors that are demanded by governmental customers. Still, market dynamics by themselves don't cope with the strategic purposes that our military industries are supposed to serve, situation over which Member States have a central political role by pushing and stimulating research and development, and also in efficiently reorganize the industry's tissue. Governmental investment could, therefore, acquire the needed defence technology and thusly maintain the necessary strategic edge, with the advantage of generating spill-over effects over the economy, while simultaneously breeding from adjacent capabilities via a spin-in dynamic.

European industry is also facing the competition from growing economies such as China, India, or Brazil, and should pay a great deal of attention to the potentialities of new markets. So, besides preserving the global profit share, new industrial and technological partnerships should also be sought.

Defence industries should, for this matter, be structured in an integrated way amongst Europe's industrial landscape, based on a coordinated approach, and also on a unified expenditure of resources. An increased mutual inter-dependence between all States also has the benefit of fostering an innovative competitive environment, at the same time as responsibilities are shared. In synthesis, cooperation, specialization, and a wider involvement between Member States in Defence projects could create a dynamic similar to the one existent in the USA.

All these conditions would increase the prospects for maintaining Europe in the Defence Technologies route. It would also allow the maintenance of its jobs in all Members' territory, at the same time it would play an important role in EU's economy. Political action shows to be essential, to the extent that government-oriented strategic priorities may create joint research programs and market procurement, and although European Commission's Directives 2009/81/EC and 2009/43/EC are already in advance, further steps are urgently required.

## **5. OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME WHEN PROPOSING THE SOLUTIONS**

When proposing these different solutions, a multitude of questions and obstacles comes to mind. What is withholding the different national governments to work together on an European scale? Will all Members be happy with the use of different budgets? And lastly, are there any problems with dual-use technologies?

It is difficult for governments to allow the closure of main construction plants to consolidate on a European level, yet it will have to happen. National "economic" and "employment" reasons, considerations of acceptable interdependency, perceived loss of sovereignty, or not, will complicate here the decision making. The governments have to be convinced that the fragmentation of the defence and security market, fragmentation of defence and security industry and fragmentation of the defence and security budget is a vicious circle that prevents the market to do at the European level what the market did in greater states: come to the merging of defence and security industries into larger, better performing entities. It prevents the smarter spending of the continuously becoming scarcer financial possibilities of the Ministries of Defence in Europe.

There is the challenge of acquiring newly identified needed capabilities that are now totally or partially lacking: Intelligence collection, observation/communication from space, ballistic missile defence, projection of airpower from the sea, air refuelling and many others that are difficult if not impossible to be achieved by a single European Nation. The NATO AWACS program is a good example of how internationally can be acquired what is nationally impossible.

Proposing that every Member State has to contribute a certain budget to common defence and security budgets, for example research and development, is not an easy solution. In these times of financial crisis and everlasting growing costs, it is difficult to convince the citizens of each state that their taxes will be used in a common defence budget rather than a national budget. When asking these citizens which budgets have to be cut in order to achieve the nationally planned budget savings, the most common answer is always the defence budget. Thus the citizens have to be convinced of the necessity of a common defence budget through

public awareness. Today Member States are already drastically reducing their investments in new research programs. This will have important negative effects such as the closure of critical industrial capacities. They will be difficult to recover in the future.

When thinking about dual-use of (military) technologies, there is always the problem of it not being dedicated to a single use. This implicates that for the technology to be serving multiple purposes, there has to be a loss of function in some domains, to be effective in others. Take for example radar. For it to detect targets far away, the beam width has to be narrow. Small targets won't be detected. When enlarging the beam width, small targets can be detected, but it won't be affective on large distances.

Driven by the argument of budget needed to build two (or more) separate dedicated technologies, this loss of efficiency or function is nowadays more or less acceptable.

## **6. CONCLUSION**

The defence industry is not an industry like any other industry, which is primary focused on making profits, being efficient, and creating jobs. Indeed, although these factors are also important in the defence industry, but moreover the defence industry is about combating threats to nations and their citizens. The main aim of nations to counter threats will therefore have its effect on the way governments are willing to work together, either bilateral or in an international structure, to combine their national defence structures. The first priority of European states is to keep their own country safe and therefore governments are reluctant to give up some of their autonomy when it comes to defence cooperation. In a way, cost efficiency in defence industry is only a second priority of the European states.

On the other hand, EU member states are having problems with making the necessary investments in the defence industry to keep it up to date. For example, budgets are decreasing, but at the same time the investments for research and development and buying defence material are increasing. In other words: more money is needed to keep the defence infrastructure and tools up to date while at the same time, less money is available. This is a motivation for governments to look at the possibilities to combine their national defences.

These two interests mentioned above are creating a paradox. On one hand, EU member states prefer to keep as much as autonomy in on their defence structure as possible, while on the other hand states are pushed to work together because of economic reasons. A solution for this challenge must therefore recognize and respect both interests.

In this paper several options to tackle the defence challenge are mentioned and these solutions will be shortly repeated below.

First of all, by combining the defence industries, several budgetary problems can be sorted. Since there is a high level of fragmentation of the defence industry in the European Union, huge amounts of money can be saved by combining certain tasks every European Union member state is now doing on its own. For example, research and development; training of military personnel; and buying the same military hardware.

Combining the budget has however a consequence: states have to give up their autonomy to some extent. Since the defence industry is an abnormal industrial sector wherein security of a nation is the primary goal, combining industries for economic reasons is not the most important or exclusive argument. To combine industries, states have to trust each other. It is clear that not all member states of the EU are ready yet to give up some of their autonomy in the defence area. To avoid a stand still situation in the European wide defence cooperation by waiting until all EU member states are ready –a situation which will maybe never happen- a coalition of the willing can be constructed. Such a construction is not a new concept in the defence area since some states are already working together in different areas. Next, this construction is also already practiced in the EU regarding different subjects such as the Euro-area. By promoting European cooperation at different speed, countries that are likeminded will work together and countries that have different priorities and national interests will not slow-down the cooperation process. Many European wide projects have already been initiated by just a small number of states whereby other states joined in a later stadium when the initiatives proved its success. In this way whereby member states can autonomously choose whether or not they want to work together; to which extent they want to work together and with which EU member states, the public receptivity of the defence industry will probably be increase since more successes can be booked with less investments.

Secondly, the European defence industry can be improved by a certain amount of standardization. Standardization will have positive effects in both the budgetary problems states are facing, while it respects the autonomy of European Union member states at the same time. Standardization will also have positive effects on the budget because different parts of the military means will be easier exchangeable. Military missions can then be easily executed with more countries and will face less practical problems such as, for example, combining communication systems or the recovery of damaged equipment. More positive effects of standardization, like combining training methods or using interchangeable parts, have obvious practical advantages during military activity.

Thirdly, the paper is proposing a different focus in the process of research and development. A focus on multiple use of military instruments; spin-offs and spin-ins of technology will make the research and development of military hardware reach the break-even point in an earlier stage. This has economic benefits and it will also improve the public receptivity of the defence industry in a positive way.

To conclude, the defence industry and technical base will probably always be a hot topic. Therefore, this paper argues to think before acting, in order to look for intelligent solutions and to let EU member states cooperate at different speed.

# The importance of Mediterranean area for the European Union

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# Introduction: From Mare Nostrum to Mediterranean area

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The Mediterranean is the southern geographical frontier of Europe. However, for the last centuries, a negative vision has been shaping our thoughts concerning the Mediterranean region. On one side, the Muslim countries have been, since then, connected with irresolvable tensions and conflicts. On the other hand, the southern European countries have been associated to chronicle low economic development and persistent financial problems.

But it wasn't always so. The Mediterranean basin was the birth place of the three great civilizations that managed to shape the modern western world: Greek, Roman, and Islamic. For several millennia, the Mediterranean region, far from being unstable and poor, was a land of prosperity and opportunities. During the roman period, most of the grain used to feed Rome, the mobs and the legions, would come from the so called *Mare Nostrum*, and especially from ancient Numidia, today Algeria, and Egypt. It was also in Numidia and the Iberian Peninsula that several roman nobles had their estates.

During the dark Middle Age, the Muslim world, in the south, was the loyal keeper of the Greek-roman cultural and intellectual legacy. The Renaissance, which led to the restoration of the rational thinking and the rediscovery of science, allowed the coming of the so called "enlightment era" and, as a consequence, the modern age in which we live today. The rebirth of this forgotten European identity would have not been possible without the careful preservation of the classic heritage by the Islamic peoples.

The Mediterranean established itself as a major trading centre. From the east, the silk route or the spices route coming as far away from the legendary China and the exotic India; or the gold and ivory route, coming from the mysterious Gulf of Guinea and passing through the ancient city of Timbuktu, all converged to the Mediterranean. Then appeared the major trading powers: first Venice and Genoa, and not much later, Portugal and Spain and their trading and colonial empires all across the world.

From the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Muslim genius gave the world mathematics, the Arabic numeration, algebra or, even more important, the algorithms, a fundamental element for the evolution of the most complex developments in information and communication technologies (ICT). It also developed astronomy and sailing crafts and techniques, which provided the scientific and technological basis for the discovery of hidden continents and unexplored seas by Portuguese and Spanish, and whose efforts would clear the way for the expansion and establishment of Europe as the major power in the world.

In spite of its weaknesses, the Mediterranean region still offers great opportunities and hopes of prosperity for both sides. Therefore, a new and incisive impulse to promote a common European policy towards the Mediterranean is urgent and required in order to make history

happen again and allow Europe to benefit from the potentialities of a region which has always been its traditional area of projection and influence.

In this context, Euro-Mediterranean relationships evolved a lot since the beginning of the 90's. The point of this paper is to identify the geostrategic issues through an analysis of the weakness and threats coming from the Mediterranean and the way that European Union try to cooperate. But first, we have to draw a theoretical framework through a conceptual approach consisting on highlighting what Mediterranean means for European Union.

## Mediterranean definition

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First of all, it seems important to draw the borders of the area. The European part of the area extend from Portugal to Greece and Cyprus. The other part of Mediterranean extend from Morocco to Lebanon and Syria.

Moreover, it's essential to stress that the South part of Mediterranean hasn't the same importance for all of the European countries. Actually the history link which exist between some European state members and their former colonies play a major role on the perception of the importance or not to build a bridge between the two parts of Mediterranean. For instance, France has a really closed relationship with Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon. So, when we try to identify the Mediterranean geostrategic issues for European Union, we have to take into account the heritage, the importance of the past.

In 1995, the European Union launched the Barcelona process which was mostly dedicated to the resolution of the Israeli Vs Arab countries conflict and to created a peace and prosperity area. But it failed to help to bring the peace to the region. Few years after, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy initiated the Union for Mediterranean in 2008. But the degradation of the situation between Palestine and Israel (attack from Israel in 2009 against Gaza Strip and the fact that some Arab countries don't want to be part of a process if Israel is in it) and the Arab spring events modified the political context. The inertia of the European Union concerning the Arab spring and its incapacity to react to the Syrian conflict because of divergences between membership show that European Union faces a crisis regarding the way to deal with the South part of Mediterranean.

Nowadays, the borders have disappeared leading into a globalized world. It is for this reason that the cooperation must be an obligation of the countries in order to receive more profits in the international area.

This should be the way that Mediterranean countries would develop with efectiveness. Until now, there were many initiatives, programmes, meetings, etcetera, but they did not succeed because of many obstacles, mainly based on disputes between countries, shores and the lack of willness of states to give sovereignty.

The Mediterranean area is a deeply unequalled place where countries with different characteristics, historical background and economic development. There are four cleavages in this sense: first, between countries of the Northern area of Mediterranean; secondly, between the countries of Maghreb; thirdly, between East and West parts of Mediterranean Sea, and finally, between the Northern shore and the southern. In this environment, the dialogue seems an utopia.

In spite of that, we can consider some of the initiatives with an ambitious programme in the region:

*Western European Union (WEU)/ European Union:* Petersberg missions are one of the most important activities in this area in the European Union. On the other hand, the WEU launched the Mediterranean subgroup (1992), where problems of Mediterranean security were discussed. In addition, within the framework of the WEU, WEU Mediterranean countries created “the fast operating Euroforce” (EUROFOR) and “the European maritime force” (EUROMARFOR).

*Euro-Arab dialogue (DEA):* the European Union and the Arab League decided to cooperate in the energy field in 1973 - in hibernation until 1989- with the Euro-Mediterranean Conference proposed by the French President Mitterrand. It had a confrontation with the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (promoted by Italy and Spain), that added with other factors, did that the DEA was locked up to our days.

*Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):* created to maintain good relations between the European Union and the countries of the Mediterranean (and exposed in the Helsinki Final Act, in 1975). At the Conference in Stockholm in 1986, issues of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Middle East countries were attached to the agenda of the CSCE, and four years later, in Palma de Mallorca, Italy and Spain proposed the creation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), the precedent to the Barcelona Process. In 1994, the heads of State and Government strengthened security in the area through peaceful dialogue and as main objective, promoting economic and social development of the countries of the Mediterranean. In 1994, it changed its name from CSCE to OSCE, keeping the same way to follow in the Mediterranean. We must highlight the creation of the Contact Group with the Partners for Co-operation (1994), as part of the OSCE, including seminars and parliamentary forums on the Mediterranean, interacting Asian and Arab countries.

*Dialogue 5 + 5 (1990):* it is an informal forum of dialogue and regional cooperation, with multidisciplinary, comprising Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The 5 + 5 Dialogue presents advantages compared to other initiatives in the region due to its flexible and practical character. In addition, it is the only forum in which Libya participates as a full member.

*The Barcelona Process (1995):* political and security cooperation is one of the three pillars of the Process. It is legally non-binding political commitment, ensuring internal and external stability of the States that sign it. Their fields are the disarmament, non-proliferation, organized crime, terrorism (code of conduct against terrorism) and drug trafficking, among

others. The Mediterranean Forum (1994), Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, France, Italy, Greece, Malta and Turkey, is framed within the Barcelona process.

*Union for the Mediterranean* (2008): is a new impulse in order to revitalise Barcelona Process, headed by Nicolas Sarkozy. The priorities in this dialogue will be: de-pollution of the Mediterranean, higher education – i.e. Euro-Mediterranean University- , business development and maritime and land highways. Promotion of democracy, safeguard of Human Rights and protection of the civil society are part of UfM programmes. UfM is composed by the 27 European Union member states, Mediterranean Partner countries, the League Arab States and Libya as an observer state.

Furthermore, there are other actors and organizations that have realised of the potential of the area. A good example of that is the United States role in the Mediterranean, based in three precepts: the importance of the Mediterranean for European security; secondly, understand the Mediterranean as a means of communication with the Persian Gulf; thirdly, the Mediterranean as a place with big problems, which must be remedied by the European Union. In this sense, the NATO have developed a strategic roadmap:

*Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO)*. Relations between NATO and the Mediterranean are composed by several initiatives in order to gain influence in this geostrategic area, for example, Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED, replacing NAVACFORMED) and in 1995, after a meeting of the Atlantic Council in Brussels, it was created the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue. Other NATO initiatives: Subcommittee of the Mediterranean Basin (1990), ready to deal with the instability of the region, and proposing groups, courses and conferences, etc. Finally, include the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004), which boosted NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue through the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

However, this organizations and the intention of the States of create a framework in the Mediterranean area has not reached the expected results.

## Threats from Mediterranean and regulation from European Union

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The region consists of the southern and eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is of strategic importance for the European Union. Indeed, the Council and the Commission consider it a top priority in the EU's external relations.

The MEDA Regulation is the main instrument of economic and financial cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (PEM). Launched in 1996 (MEDA I) after the Barcelona Conference of 1995 and amended in 2000 (MEDA II), allows the European Union (EU) to provide financial and technical assistance to the south countries of the Mediterranean: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Palestinian Territories, Tunisia and Turkey.

The program is addressed to States, their regional and local authorities and civil society actors. Fundamental principles of the Barcelona Declaration are:

- Make the euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on respect for the basic principles such as human rights and democracy (political and security).
- Building area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of a free trade area between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners and among the partners themselves, accompanied by substantial financial support from the European Union in order to facilitate economic transition and to help partner countries to cope with the economic and social consequences of this reform process (economic and social partnership).
- Develop human resources, promote understanding between cultures and rapprochement between the peoples of the euro-Mediterranean region and to develop free and flourishing civil society (Partnership in social, cultural and human).

However, the growth of immigration in Europe and the development of transnational terrorism, especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the U.S.A. and the following ones in Europe, have created unexpected political convergence among EU states and those of the Mediterranean and resulted in concrete cooperation for the management of irregular migration, the fight against terrorism and certain aspects of maritime relations.

Illegal immigration and terrorism are among the top risk factors that have led the EU in 1995 to launch the Barcelona Process. The intention was to give impetus to the development to reduce incentives to immigration, as well as policy reforms and conflict resolution to eliminate the root causes of radicalization of groups and individuals who see violence, including terrorism, a legitimate political tool.

The EU strategy for the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration were gradually moved outside the borders of the Union, involving, to varying degrees, the neighboring countries already committed under the euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

The common policies on security of the EU have developed, step by step response to traumatic events. At the same time, the intensification of migration flows in the 2000s from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean have led to a thorough revision of the common policy in the area of law enforcement to immigration.

Both members of the EU and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean have been affected by acts of internal terrorism (2004-2005 in Europe, 2002 Tunisia, Egypt, 2004, Morocco 2007) and the transnationalization of terrorist groups.

They generally share the belief that the fight against terrorism should be a priority both in their internal policies as well as in their cooperation.

Looking at Community cooperation more properly, it can be seen starting in 2003 and on the basis of the European Security Strategy, cooperation euro-existing Mediterranean is also being reengineered in an anti-terrorism. This is called outsourcing sense of the Area of Justice and Security Policy, which is putting in place outside the territory of the Union of policies for the security of the territory.

Despite the proliferation of multilateral initiatives, it is necessary to point out that most of the anti-terrorist activities continue to take place at the bilateral level. Historical background and geographical proximity, such as the common experience of countering terrorism in France and Algeria and collaboration between Spain and Morocco developed after the attacks on Spanish territory, act as levers for a relationship of trust between the intelligence services that the cooperation between sets of countries or international organizations can hardly create.

In addition, the Mediterranean basin plays the role of the main protagonist for the exchange of drugs distributed throughout Europe. The main threat is represented by cocaine trafficking, drug increasingly used in Europe, where traffic is managed at every stage of the supply chain by powerful criminal organizations:

- From the South-america in the European Union via the Atlantic Ocean, from Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador to coastal areas of Spain, Portugal and up to the main ports Belgian, Dutch and Italian.
- Although in Africa does not produce cocaine, the north-western Africa is a point of traffic and storage of cocaine from South America to Europe. The Mediterranean is an important crossroads of trade of all kinds of drugs, including synthetic drugs manufactured in Europe, especially ecstasy.

Over the past decade, the EU has stepped up efforts to make it more effective Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to combat terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking of drugs. Deepened the perception that the three phenomena constitute the most serious threat to our common security. The result was a tendency to progressive outsourcing of the policies of security. But that still leaves open three fundamental questions:

- The three phenomena are increasingly overlapping.
- The policies that result tend to apply the same remedies to phenomena of different nature, which limits its effectiveness.
- The set of measures taken at different levels is often impenetrable to a full democratic control and threatens to limit the exercise of rights and the protection of the freedoms of European citizens and those of partner countries.

# Opportunities for the European Union

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In spite of the economical crisis that is especially affecting to the European Mediterranean countries, they still have the same importance (even more, currently) as before because of their geostrategic situation. This geographical localization is very important either European or Arabic countries or the international relations between them. The large amount of natural resources in Northern African countries is very important for the European Mediterranean countries' economy, but it is necessary for African countries too, because they are influenced by western economy that help them for rising their own economy, creating jobs to avoid Islamic radicalization among their society.

So it is very positive for the defense and security of Europe and the stabilization of its southern borders, as well as for the Mediterranean countries, to improve relations and cooperation in both sides. So, it is one clear instance as economic activities can help to improve the European defense and security.

Another important issue about economic activities is the Mediterranean sea security, European Union must allow the free naval circulation, because nowadays that security is been affected by eastern threats and northern African conflicts (for instance, Libya warfare and Lebanon conflicts), therefore, strategic policies that European Union are realizing in its borders show that threats can influence a lot, in the economic growth.

Moreover, concerning the European foreign policy, there is a not enough consideration about the Mediterranean issues and its geostrategic importance for all of the countries, even the North or East countries. Membership like Spain, Italy or France are contributing a lot on the security of Europe and one of the main reasons of that it is that Mediterranean European countries are very near to Africa. For instance, European Mediterranean area contributes doing easier than northern European countries to the defense and security of Europe on the whole. It is showed in international European operations like Atalanta operations, EUTM operations and at the Libya warfare with international headquarters, and I am sure that these circumstances have contributed to the well conducting and the final success of these operations. So the Mediterranean area keeps being one strategic and important key for the peace on the world.

Also, we can say that defense and security it's just not one military task, but also, there are many civil affairs like economy, foreign policy, culture and international relations. That means whoever European citizen can influence with their job within the European security.

# Conclusion: One Europe, one frontier one sea.

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It's difficult to imagine, conceptually speaking, of such a great organization as EU to be divided on such an important subject as the Mediterranean. Different initiatives have been all resulted in failure, with each bordering country taking his way in a rather selfish attitude that we have seen on other controversial topics within the EU. The fact is that, these situations aren't new, but they were mostly solved by lobbying blocs of members. For us, this stalemate could be solved if this subject was enlarged to all EU countries, forcing in some way a more participated forum and not only those countries whose borders are directly in contact with the Mediterranean Sea. If it at a first glance these are the ones that matter and are one that should be given the account, it would be a rather hypocritical position to discard the rest of the member states. Geography shouldn't be an issue nowadays, when frontiers within the EU are open, and the flow of goods and people from all over the world is a fact.

To add more arguments to the necessity of involvement of all EU parts, a perfect example as the maritime traffic that goes through Mediterranean Sea, coming in from the Black Sea, Suez Channel and, of course, shore countries ends or stops in ports far away within the EU is considerable. So it seems easy to understand that rather than seeing the Mediterranean Sea as others problem, we should consider it as common problem, because more than any other definition, it's in fact the south border of EU. For starters we can't talk about security in the EU if we forget borders. These are the first line of defense, which appears to us particularly sensitive given the fact of the open borders treaty affects one way or the other all of EU members. If used correctly this shouldn't be a problem, as another example of a mandatory cooperation between countries has had success on past time, like airport security. Countries found out after several known problems that they had to share the burden, rules and effort to promote a better and safer air travel for all, dealing this way with their common problems. So, again, it seems to us that if this could be achieved, a Mediterranean solution can be found involving all member states of the EU. This common effort would force a consensus, avoiding the usual rivalry between neighboring EU countries in the Mediterranean.

So, we recommend to:

- European Union should not intervene in political matters (no inferences) but focus on economic matters to bring more stability and security in the area instead of considerate that we can and we must bring democracy and rule of law in other countries without taking into account the specialty of each country. For instance, concerning the Arab Spring, European Union can help to build rules of law and democratic states with respect to the fundamental rights because it is a security issues for the EU for lot of reasons: the domino effect if EU succeed to help to the democratization of states, support to countries which are into a process of democratization can help to reinforce the credibility of EU regarding the values it defends, the development of a peace and prosperity area could be a benefit for the economy of EU. But EU has to take into account the cultural and religious “exceptions”.
- At the same time, when one European country deepens its political ties with one Arabic country, the last one may face some problems with its neighborhood due to the image of western countries in the Arabic world, However, a common European policy towards the Mediterranean would bring all together around the same goals without any special treatment, allowing therefore the improvement of the relations on both sides of the Mediterranean.
- The time of the global approach for the Euro-Mediterranean relationship is over, especially concerning security matters. European Union has to adapt and create new tools taking into account the heterogeneity of different situations (from peace, to instability through collapse states). For instance, European Union should stop considerate Mediterranean as an only one area but maybe divide the zone in two parts: the Maghreb with Libya (terrorism, drug trafficking, immigration) and the Machrek (religious war between chii and sunni communities).
- European Union has also to take into account the diversity of actors in the Mediterranean region and try to create realistic agreements on special matters, regarding the need of each country. So European Union should elaborate a strategy which takes into account the fact that the threats are not the same in each country. And this strategy has to be attractive because if it’s not, the Mediterranean countries will prefer another partnership, against the European Union interests.
- Finally, the most important point is to mobilize all of European countries on the interest for all of them to have a stable and peaceful area in Mediterranean region. The most important is the support of all countries even if they are not the major player of the process.

**V YEEC 2013**

**Toledo, July 14-20**

**“The defence of Europe: past, present and future”**

**WG 5 (1)**

**The future of the European Society: risks and opportunities**

(1) While still facing historical threats the European Union and its societies are now threatened by new dangers to its common interests. Those interests could be divided in two different groups. In one hand strategic and energy ones that are needed in order to preserve the vital interests of every nations that must be preserved. In the other hand, economic interests as the economy back security and defense policies of the European Union; and these interests are linked to different threats.

First of all we have to remember that terrorism, mainly islamist's one, remain one of the major threats that we are facing as it can strikes us at every moment on one of our most important and strategic infrastructure. Thus if that threats can be located in north africa and Sahel for a major part, they are not the only ones in this area.

Indeed the European Union has a critical need of gas routed through Northern Africa or even of african's uranium. These threats are linked to one of our most important common interest that was, is and will be energy independance. Moreover such threats are also encountered on the other side of Europe: remember what happened when Russia closed gas valves.

Thus these traditionnal threats are now joined by one we can called cyberthreat, and which will be one of the new challenge for our defense. Thereby a cyber-attack can paralyse an entire country and so doing seriously weakene its defense. That is why this threats may be kepted in mind.

There are also some other threats that can be linked with the two major groups of interests we were previously differentiate. This is the case of the Iranian one. Indeed in the most admitted scenario, Iran will strike Israel that would surely lead to the commitment of the European Union through its member part of the NATO. And all these would end, at least on an economical point of view, in the closing of the Ormuz strait what would be a cataclysm to our economy and our oil supplying.

Then comes the armement and defense contracts issue. In an ever more opened to concurrency Europe, even if the European preference still lay on the table on these questions, we could be feared that huge abroad economical giants receive a part of our defense technology in transfer that are systematic in such contracts. These could be defined as a political threat that weakens our economy.

Finally the piracy remain the major threat on our economy interests, coming both from Horn of Africa or Gulf of Guinea. Thus if piracy in the Gulf of Guinea seems now to be the one that will fear our societies in the year that are coming we have to remember that the European Atalanta mission has been a real success as piracy in the Horn of Africa has decreased to an irrelevant level.

As we've just seen it is possible to find solutions to the threats we are facing, even at a European scale, what should encourage us continuing in this way.

(2) The solution for protecting both the specific national and common European interests, which we can find in respectively in the member-states own and the EU security strategies, all European member-states should be aware of those interests and threats.

Awareness, which could be established under the auspices of EDA, provides for understanding of the capabilities which are needed to offer an adequate response. This study should result in a 'wish-list', stating which military capabilities are needed to protect the common European interests. Important as well, citizens of Europe should be made aware of these threats and interests. With that awareness, support, in effect 'hearts & minds', for defense will be established.

Secondly, now there is a clear image of all common and specific national interests, the EU member-states, perhaps in smaller coalitions, can easily pin out overlap in those national interests, i.e. formulate common interests in a bi- or trilateral size. These smaller coalitions will find mutual benefit in countering these together.

It must therefore, like with threads and interest, be clear what the niche capabilities of the memberstates are.

Smaller coalitions which face the same threats, should in good conversation assesse which military capacities are needed to counter those threats. Here the niche expertise of each state could be completed by the capacities of the other states in the coalition, which will result in a comprehensive answer. Thus, task specialisation occurs and effectiveness and lower costs will be the result.

Such scenario can be explained by looking at a chessboard. The board represents the battleground and each chess-piece holds its own specific capabilities which is a unique asset in helping conquering the enemy. Smaller coalitions fighting the same enemy, could determine which state delivers which chess-piece.

Initiatives to cooperate on a bi- or trilateral basis may not found ideal, but they should not be disapproved since they entail a huge advantage. If small coalitions of member states obtain a focus on a special task, e.g. intelligence gathering from out of sea, their assets and excellence can be of huge asset in giving effect to the European and national security strategies.

Hence, the fragmentated availability of defence equipment can effectively put in work.

Common threats should be approached and countered with the whole European coalition. Member-states should contribute by delivering those assets which together form all the needed chess-pieces.

#### Cooperation, interoperability & standardisation

Inherent to complementarity and cooperation is standardisation of military means, in order to increase interoperability. Not only military means, but also the training and competences of the forces should be taken into account.

Especially in the areas of facilitating the high-violence level, for example air-to-air refueling of jet-fighters or bombers, cooperation and a high level of interoperability should be established. Relatively simple means, such as the uniforms of the forces, should be in such way the same that they could be handled together, i.e. they can be washed together on the same temperature.

A solution for tasks which might be political controversial to cooperate on, such as cyberdefense, need guidance from 'above'. In this example, an European Expertise and Counter Cyberdefense organ should be established. Here, like at Europol, intelligence should be delivered by memberstates in order to enrich it. After the intel is enriched, the specific state determines which other states may have access to the data. In such way, a healthy balance between intergouvernmentality and suppranationality can be found.

(3) The given solutions as been written in the previous chapter, may increase the effectiveness in dealing with threats and interests within the European Union as well as outside European borders.

But as we know, the process and outcomes regarding implementation of solutions that have been given rely on the devotion and support of the national institutions as well as the European institutions, not to forget the importance of the support of citizens of the Union. It is inevitable that in the process of implementing solutions or new policy measurements, the European Union must deal with political hurdles. The question rising is: What political hurdles does the European Union have to consider and may face in the future to guarantee and to make sure the outcomes are the same as the political institutions in Europe as well as the European Society expects?

Let us begin with the economical and financial crisis. In times of economical and financial crisis in a Union where the member states depend on each other for stability of both economy as financial state, a new form of euroscepticism may occur and grow, because economical and financial unstable member states, demand more solidarity. That opens the discussion to the limits of solidarity within the Union, not only at political level but also at other levels in the European society. For the economical and financial weaker countries to gain and guarantee stability in a certain future, they give up some sovereignty. For stronger states in this, it means they need to invest in the less stable countries to prevent that their own national economy and financial stability will be negatively affected. With the demands of the international institutions that comes with the financial support for the national economy in need of help, the citizens of these states suffer the consequence at short-term, for example with the cutting-budget policies. The more stable states that lent money, in terms of solidarity, may find in their national society some doubts about the purpose and the results from this investment for their own national economy and financial stability.

In both situations, there is fertile ground for growth of this new form of euroscepticism among the people of the European Society: whether in more stable or economical instable countries.

A second political hurdle the European Union faces is the need of a long-term strategic plan, that as general Yaniz was saying in his lecture during this conference, is now relying on the European Agreement of 2003. Moreover, short term thinking seems to be having more attention at national level, above long term thinking because of the democracy.

A long term strategy at EU level may ask an investment in terms of money and/or changes in institutions that may influence the popularity of sitting parties in each member-state. Thus, the political costs of long term strategic planning may affect the length and difficulty of the process gaining a longterm strategic plan in defense for Europe.

Not only are the political cost of interest in naming the longterm strategy as a political hurdle. As well as in the case of the economical crises, its raising the question of sovereignty and solidarity. For example, do the member states support standardization and furthermore; at what level?

“You should know both young and not so young”, said General Frederico Garcia during his lecture when we’re talking about awareness of Defence in Europe. The lack of awareness has a great impact in the majority of the member-states societies. It is crucial that the national parliaments and European society support the solutions and the process of implementing them.

The lack of awareness leads normally to a poor European citizenship, and then increase the disbelief in European institutions. In order to successfully implement solutions, awareness is fundamental.

(4) Having said this, it is understandable that the society should be the core of the European policies, even when it turns to defence and security – in fact, the European project has been thought and idealized for the people.

For the future, Europe needs a more active and motivated society. However, we should also demand for more information, awareness and transparency among the European institutions and the member-states.

In the one hand, Europe needs a clear defence and security strategy that considers not only today's interests and threats, but also that promotes the human dignity and security, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, as stated on the Treaty of the European Union, article 2. These are actually the principles which unify every 28 State-members, despite all the differences.

In the other hand, with a defined strategy, Europe must take into account that its society and each European citizen has the right to be well informed on defence and security, even though it is a sensible sector. In our opinion, this awareness should start in the early ages and should be common – here, the youth European population plays an imperative role. It is important that the European citizenship starts from the very first beginning. In order to achieve that, it is our understanding that the instruction is the key. An educational system that includes both the national and European most important historical facts which have contributed for the development of our continent for the last centuries, since the Roman Empire.

The future of the European society needs cooperation and integration. Moreover, the common policies should be clear and spread among the Europeans as far as possible. Youth, education, solidarity and transparency are key factors to keep the idea of Europe alive.

# **The Future of European Defense**

*Paper working group 6*

## **Introduction**

As part of the Eurodefense conference 2013 in Toledo each working group has been assigned to write a paper about a specific topic. This paper is written by working group 6 and covers the future of European defense. First it deals with what the group members consider the main threats for and interests of the European continent, as well as the main goals and priorities of the EU. The writers then summarize shortly the main roadblocks of European defense integration, followed by the recommendations to pass by or demolish these roadblocks.

The defense of the European citizens, Europe's territorial integrity and its interests are ensured, mainly, by NATO and the EU. As a product of the Cold War, NATO has established in article 5 of the military treaty that an attack on one member state is an attack on all members states. This article has been the single most important notion of deterrence against potential security threats against Europe. In the Treaty of Lisbon the defense and security policy have been established by the Article 27 of the Treaty of the European Union. The common security and defense policy are there to ensure the maintenance of peace, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The main purpose of European defense is freedom and security of all its members which is ensured by both political and military means. However, despite recognizing the merits of the defense mechanisms and structures that we already have at our disposal, we should not fail to see that the emergence of new threats (terrorism, cyber security, piracy, etc.) which represent a clear challenge to Europe. Consequently, Europe must be capable to adapt to these new threats and be ready to respond to them. In this sense, it is equally essential to streamline decision making mechanisms and to underline the necessity of increasing collaboration between the two bodies mentioned above, since the future of Europe depends on it.

The analysis of European interests and threats that are connected to these interests lead us to propose some measures in order to strengthen European defense capabilities and to reinforce Europe on the international scene. The next chapter will deal with what we consider to be the main threats to European security, as well as Europe's interests.

## **The future of Europe, threats and interests**

As Javier Solana stated in 2003, "As the EU grows to encompass 25 countries with some 450 million inhabitants producing one quarter of the world's GDP, we have a duty to assume our

responsibilities on the world stage. As a global actor the Union must now face up to its responsibility for global security.”

When listing recommendations for a comprehensive and durable foreign and defense policy, one has to start by listing the concrete interests of the European Union. When putting the most important threats that correspond with these interests it becomes possible to identify the gaps in EU policy.

Today the EU's most significant asset is its economic weight, being the largest economic entity in this world, it is clear that maintaining and increasing this is a key interest of the EU. The general economic interest is heavily depending on some specific pillars, such as international trade routes, international rules on trade, a constant and secured stream of raw materials, with a special emphasis on energy resources, and competitiveness.

There are some immediate security related threats that can be seen as forms of interference to our economic interests. First, there is the safety of Europe's network of international trade lines, being possibly threatened by rogue states or pirate activity, the complete security of these is hard to maintain. Secondly, there is the non-compliance of international rules by other countries, which could have its negative impact on the EU's economy. Third, it is necessary to acknowledge the various territorial disputes concerning some strategically important resources. In this field the Arctic region and Eastern part of the Mediterranean have the potential to both lucrative and heavily disputed.

Not all threats to Europe's economic interest are posed by other countries in this world. In the last decades global warming can be considered as an important variable which could affect the Union in different way. First there is the melting of the North Pole, which already has been mentioned above. Next, it is likely that drought can seriously impede crops in the southern member states, which immediately will make fresh water a scarce good comparable to oil, gas and minerals. This comparison makes it easy to estimate the possibility of violence between countries for access to fresh water. Finally, there is also clear proof of greater chances for natural disasters to hit the Union and form a great challenge for the member states.

Next to economic interests we have to assess the European interests and threats that are related to security and security in a more general way. When reading the European Security Strategy of 2003, a stable Europe in a stable neighborhood sums up nicely the EU's main interest in this field. This stability has to be achieved on both economical and political level.

The Arab Spring did not change the fact that Europe is surrounded by a wide range of unstable countries, of which some are parts of rather inflammable situations. The largest threat to the interest of stability can be summarized under the overarching issue of failed states. Of which nasty side –effects can be identified but not limited to; organized crime, terrorism, regional instability, etc.

All the issues mentioned above are threats and interests that are all well-known. Although it is impossible to look into the future, one should be able to at least try to identify possible developments that might be still under the radar. One could think of regional separatism, large immigration flows from new areas of war, the outbreak of pandemics, the uncontrollable rise of technological advancements which may create benefits as well as new threats and a major catastrophe such as a tsunami, earth quake or volcano eruption. Even as these situations may seem unlikely and hard to predict, Brussels ought to be planning for these ‘unknown unknowns’ just as it is for known problems and challenges.

### **Goals and priorities**

Keeping in mind the above interests and threats which are the starting point of any kind of defense strategy on the European level, we have decided to identify the main areas that the EU should focus on. In order to define the main framework for the future of European defense, we have to identify the core values any strategic paper has to take into account.

When doing this, the protection of European territories and its citizens against international threats is the main and obvious priority. Ensuring the security and integrity of territory is the main task of any state, as it is for the European continent. Needless to say, this is the main task of the military.

The next goal is our European way of life that has to be preserved. More specific, the combination of our freedom and rights, together with our great economic prosperity are things that are worth fighting for. We believe that these are essential to our European identity.

All of this cannot be achieved without a robust external dimension in European policy, where the role of the military should not be underestimated. In this changing multipolar world order, Europe has to protect its position on the international scene as well as its overseas assets that contribute to our security and welfare. In order to address the security and development

nexus, the EU now tries to implement a comprehensive approach, using both military and civilian tools (humanitarian assistance, development aid, etc). Even though the EU has already launched several missions and has created several ambitious policies like the ENP, more efforts in this field are necessary. At this point we have to underscore the fact that the individual member states do not have the necessary capabilities to protect their worldwide interests in a sustainable way. Consequently, a joint and well coordinated European approach is crucial to ensure our security and way of life. In addition to this, there is the worrying fact that the other great powers in this world do not hesitate to strengthen their position. Examples are the vast Chinese investments in the African continent; their growing economic presence within some crucial European markets, as well as the large Russian share in the European energy supply are just some examples of how Europe's position is being affected. This increase in activity from emerging powers in the European neighborhood comes hand in hand with a larger presence of those countries' navies, which again shows the importance of the military component in foreign policy.

When all of the interests mentioned above are assured, then and only then, we can start to assume our international responsibility and promote our 'European' values abroad. Some of the noteworthy concepts behind these values are human security, responsibility to protect and the promotion of democracy and human rights. These core principles constitute the existing framework of European foreign policy and should be preserved and reinforced. This will consolidate Europe on the international scene as a unique actor and will legitimate its position as an essential peacekeeping actor.

However, as the main priorities for Europe are identified, it becomes clear that a number of challenges lie ahead. Europe is a patchwork of numerous states, peoples, cultures and traditions. Flowing out of each state are numerous local and national interests, often in conflict with one another. Military cooperation on the supranational level simply cannot be taken for granted. The next chapter will deal with the most important hurdles in the way of European integration with regard to security and foreign policy.

### **Roadblocks to military integration**

In a changing global security environment it is paramount that the European continent is willing and able to adapt to these changing circumstances. However, a number of seemingly unsurmountable obstacles are plaguing the EU and NATO from doing so. Without going in detail into all of the troubles that hinder European defense and foreign policies, they are

instead categorized below in three main themes: sovereignty, financial limitations and institutional rigidity.

### *Sovereignty*

The protection of one's tribe, city or nation is the ultimate pivot of self-determination, since this is about physical survival. In many national traditions, the military carries a cultural and therefore an emotional component. The military tradition often defines a nation and its people as nation-states have come to be created and defined by a violent past. Therefore, a state's security self-determination is the ultimate form of sovereignty and giving that up is something not to think too lightly about. Sovereignty therefore is a major hurdle on the road toward full-scale military integration, despite all the perceived benefits of doing so.

In practice, this translates into a number of challenges. A state is hesitant to send off its boys and girls to far-off lands to fight a conflict that is not of its own choosing, where its interests might not be compromised and where it is not under attack itself. It might have serious reservations about having its troops serve under a foreign military commander or a flag that is not its own. Moreover, in today's European democracies politicians keep a close eye on public opinion, which can easily turn against military adventures abroad. Although European states cooperate in NATO and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, these are not a substitute for national foreign and defense policies but rather an addition to them. For these and other reasons, heads of state are reluctant to give up decision making capabilities or even share power in the institutionalized international forum.

### *Financial hurdles*

A second major impediment to European military integration is cash, or to be more precise, the lack of it. Already strained, Europe's military budgets are consistently cut in the wake of the financial and economic crises as well as changing public attitudes toward military expenditures. Furthermore, as a result of European militaries spending separately on capabilities procurement and R&D, it is believed that as much as 30% of total European spending is wasted or spent inefficiently. The absence of standardization in weapons systems also contributes to these inefficiencies as the cost of maintenance and replacement during military missions go through the roof. Finally, financial hurdles as a result of institutional rigidity are keeping Europe from creating the most efficient and effective integrated army it deserves.

### *Institutional rigidity*

Institutions are usually created in response to some kind of crisis, after which the rules that govern the bureaucracy are set in place and the institution goes about dealing with the context for which it was founded. However, due to changing circumstances the institution must adapt and evolve constantly in order to be able to tackle these changes. One major problem with the (non)governmental institutions of today is that they are unable or unwilling to change.

One major hiatus of the NATO rules of the game is that the costs of a mission lie where they fall, meaning that any member state that volunteers to provide a particular set of capabilities will have to pay for these expenses itself. This means that, apart from the political costs in taking part in a mission as described above, it will also have to cover the financial burden for its participation. As a result, member state free riding within the institution is a real possibility, and it is a serious problem within NATO today. Changing this rule has turned out to be a great stumbling block in the way of reforming the North Atlantic alliance.

Another example of institutional rigidity in NATO is its mode of decision making, which is based on reaching consensus. Although the true power hierarchy between states based on military capabilities can easily be discerned on the global stage, within NATO a country with no army formally has an equal vote as the world largest superpower. This translates in all kinds of structural problems, e.g. the schism between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, pooling and sharing challenges and zero-sum considerations between states.

The EU too has a number of problems of its own, including a lack of mandate in its foreign and security policies as well as the absence of a formal relationship with NATO. "When NATO-wide issues are discussed there is no pre-meeting of an 'EU caucus' which defines an 'EU-view' and adopts a settled position to be taken into the discussion with the non-EU members of NATO - primarily, the USA, Canada and Turkey' (...)" The EU now has a Common Foreign and Security Policy, its own diplomatic service and the possibility to generate, sustain and direct small scale operations with military forces in the context of a Common Security and Defense Policy but while the tools may be theoretically 'available' the political consensus and consent to use them often is not" (Smith, 2011, p. 9).

However, when it comes to institutional reform or expansion, it is with the EU where the greatest promises lie. The next chapter will further elaborate on these promises.

## **Recommendations**

The task of this assignment has been to provide recommendations for the future of European defense. A few caveats must be made before doing so. First, due to the limited knowledge of this topic amongst all members of this working group, the task of identifying what concretely hinders European defense integration as well as prescribing a solution to these problems has been no small feat. Writing them down in a small paper within a limited amount of time is quite a daunting task. Second, to be able to come up with creative, out-of-the-box fixes for European defense challenges –which have been already been extensively researched-, this can only be attempted with the greatest amount of humility. This is why the authors have decided to provide a rather concise display of the threats, interests, goals, priorities of Europe now and in the future, as well as a more philosophical and abstract overview of the main hurdles to European integration. Still, we have attempted to show ambition in the recommendations in providing answers for European security of the future.

The first and foremost piece of advice this working group is happy to provide is for Europe to solve the obstacles of state sovereignty when it comes to European defense integration. This translates concretely into creating a European Army which is comparable with the French Legionnaires but operates like the US military. Paying and recruiting fighting units is taken care off directly by Brussels Military Headquarters, and will target individual Europeans. In doing so the EU will simultaneously bypass national member states and their legislatures. The greatest benefit of this new construction is that in the case of new security threats that require a mission out of area, the burden of political responsibility is lifted from national polities and transferred directly to the supranational. It removes the cultural-emotional component away from national military traditions since individual casualties during EU missions are being decoupled from nationalist preconceptions. It is the creation of a truly European army in which individual Europeans have freely chosen to pursue a professional military career in order to serve outside of their homeland and under a different flag.

Naturally, proposing such a bold initiative will raise a new set of challenges, including that of legitimacy, operability, finance and the relationship with member states as well as other international security institutions.

### *Legitimacy*

The above recommendation has been done outside of the current political climate in Brussels, disregarding the question whether the idea is politically viable or not. If taken into

consideration that the EU member states endorse the creation of a Pan-European army (Euro-legion), member states will still hold the reins in making decisions regarding military missions, but at the same be spared from the political fallout that might follow. The High Commissioner for CFSP, together with the European Council decides to create a new mission; the European Parliament has the mandate of overseeing the mission.

### *Operability*

With regard to operability, history has shown that units from different national and cultural backgrounds are well able to operate together. On a tactical and operational level, European land forces, navies and air forces continue to prove they work very well together in many missions around the world. Surely a pan-European fighting force consisting of European professionals can work to become an effective instrument of European security and foreign policy.

### *Finance*

Perhaps the greatest challenge ahead is finding the means to create such an army. But as is the case in any policy domain, it will only be as successful as its ambitions go. A Pan-European army may start off quite modestly with only a few battalions of fighter units. A minor new security threat that cannot be dealt with by NATO or the UN as a result of institutional arteriosclerosis could then be picked up by the EuroForce, lest it has the appropriate mandate. If proven successful, the fighting force will expand in size as time passes. Financing any mission will come directly from the EU military fund, which derives its income from a European tax, an appropriation from the EU-budget or as a percentage of each member state's military budget.

### *Member states*

There is a danger of overlap in missions and capabilities between member states, NATO, the UN and the newly formed EuroForce. Conversely, this can also be considered as a kind of 'competition' in the international security 'market'. Security threats in the EU neighborhood that cannot be solved by the traditional institutions or member states could well be tackled by the EU. Member states are still free to pursue their national interests abroad but these might as well be delegated to the EU. Budget cuts in member states can continue in earnest, going so far even as to render national armies obsolete if states choose to do so. Military capabilities owned by the state could be leased or even sold to Brussels. The national military tradition can thus be upheld, even as it becomes a thing of the past.

### *International institutions*

If possible, a direct link between NATO and the EuroForce must be pursued, and Turkey and Greece must be put on severe pressure to comply. Even if a merger between NATO and the EU is not possible, the transatlantic treaty should be maintained at all costs. The creation of a European army should be organized as to incentivize pooling and sharing of military capabilities, as well as the standardization of weapons systems.

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V YEEC 2013

European Defense Industrial and Technological  
Base (EDITB) Challenges

Working Group 8

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## **Introduction**

Since 2008, the world is facing one of the most important economic and financial crises of its modern History. Europe is probably the continent that is the most impacted with an explosion of its debt as well of the unemployment rate all over the European countries. As a consequence, the European governments are decreasing their budgets, including defense budgets.

Today European defense industries are in the leading group of world defense industry. The European defense industry makes a major contribution to security and defense of European citizens, but also to the European economy. It is the responsibility of the European policies to protect such a technological and industrial base, to be more efficient and competitive.

Nevertheless, a decrease of the defense budgets also means a decrease of the weapon procurements, threatening the stability and the sustainability of the European defense industry and its technological and industrial base (EDITB) as well as the jobs related to these activities. This situation is a major challenge to address for Europe, in order to save jobs and to preserve our strategic autonomy for the future.

Such an EDITB is an important prerequisite for an effective Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which is designed to provide the EU with the capacity for autonomous action in order to respond to international crises. A competitive EDITB is also required to give Europe the ability to cooperate internationally in the development and production of defense equipment. Such an EDITB will need also to be more integrated, less duplicative and more interdependent, i.e. more effective and more efficient.

Taking this context into account, the European Institutions have to contribute to address and to accompany the transformation strategy of the European defense industry. In May 2007 Member States already endorsed a strategy to create a stronger EDITB, focused on meeting the real operational requirements of the Armed Forces of the future, able to rapidly exploit the most promising technologies and be more competitive both in Europe and around the world.

Therefore, we have to put the emphasis on the need to preserve the EDITB but also on the way to do so. For this purpose we suggest in this paper innovative solutions to ensure a better cooperation between EU Member States in this field.

## 1. Secure capabilities to address future threats, why the EU has to preserve and develop its EDITB

In a moving strategic context, the European Union is facing the emergence of new threats such terrorism, cyber threats, insurgency, mass movements (riots), chemical and biological threats, and other known and unknown upcoming threats. However, budgets for defense are decreasing, not only due to the economic and financial crisis but also due to low political priorities for defense expenditures and societal support in most of the EU countries. Nevertheless, the recent shift of the American priorities, moving to Asia, forces the EU to adapt new responsibilities in the field of defense. The EU should become aware and to act upon this new reality for the simple reason that the EU will no longer be able to solely rely on the US to ensure its own security; without prejudice of the NATO treaty provisions. This shift must not be considered as a negative development, as it offers the opportunity to the EU to develop its own strategic concept for its defense but also to develop its technological and industrial base.

Taking into account the above mentioned constraining economic situation of the European countries and the dynamic geopolitical context, the EU members need to preserve their high level equipment in order to be able to address to different conflict situations all over the world that could threat the security of the European Union and its citizens.

Indeed, despite **decreasing defense budgets**, the EU committed itself to the **Responsibility to Protect**. This includes the protection of both citizens on European soil as others in need outside of the EU. This responsibility requires that the EU and its member states have the appropriate means to do so.

Nevertheless, these security priorities **cannot be disconnected from the economic field**. Indeed, the EDITB represents **300.000 jobs across the EU** and an interesting part of the exports of some European countries. Therefore, the preservation of this capacity also means the preservation of thousands of jobs, an absolute necessity while the unemployment rate is continuously

increasing since many years now. Moreover, It must be recalled that numerous technologies developed for defense capabilities are also used for civil purposes; contributing for example to the improvement of the health, or communication technologies. The **dual use** of these technologies would also ensure the EU to keep a high level of standards in both field, and to develop its exports thanks to innovative products.

Finally, the last but not the least, the EU has to protect, to preserve and to develop its industrial and technological base for defense matter in order to keep its strategic autonomy, including towards its traditional allies. That means that the EU would be able to develop a strategic vision, commonly shared between the EU member States, of the needed capabilities for the next ten to twenty years as well as to ensure through this strategy the ability to keep the highest level of performances able to fulfill the committed operational requirements.

In such a context, the easier way to save jobs and to preserve this strategic autonomy is to put in common our capabilities including in the field of research and development. Indeed, the time frame to develop new capabilities is not aligned with the political

## **2. How to preserve our EDITB**

### **Enhance cooperation**

Member states within the EU still have the tendency to invest in their research and development on a national level, while seeking cooperation with other countries, especially in an early stage of new research initiatives is still not a common practice. In order to solve this issue to the role and responsibilities of the EDA should be extended.

So far the significance of the EDA is only limited. For the 27 participating Member States it is not evident to use the Agency as a vehicle for cooperation. The projects that EDA implements are relatively small in budget and scope and can therefore have only limited impact.

The EDA is now in function for almost ten years but so far it has not managed to be an indispensable player in an EU where decreasing defense budgets are a reality and pooling and sharing is indispensable for member states in order to maintain their operational capabilities. On the contrary, in setting priorities for spending on defense, EDA only plays a negligible role. The Lancaster House agreement between France and the UK on enhancing defense cooperation is an example of the Agency's minor role. While EDA could offer a framework for cooperation, France and the UK decided to follow the bilateral route instead.

In order for the European Defense Agency to obtain a key role within defense cooperation within Europe, its mandate should be extended and its budget should be increased. With an increased budget EDA should for instance initiate a large pilot project where Member States are invited to jointly develop a key capability, for instance a new helicopter. This project should be managed by EDA. With such a project EDA will be able to demonstrate its added value and the Member States can get more acquainted with the idea that for the development of new capabilities EDA is the first place to go.

Another suggestion for enhancing cooperation within the EDA framework is that Member States should be obliged to report to EDA on new research initiatives in the field of defense. With this information in hand EDA can advise the Participating Member States (pMS) on seeking cooperation with countries with similar plans in a more structured fashion.

### **Cooperation between key stakeholders**

A stronger EDITB could also be achieved by encouraging the cooperation between Industry, Defense Research Organizations, Universities, SMEs and end-users. This could be done through only awarding EU funded research projects and nationally funded research projects that include the participation of all these stakeholders. The input from these players will improve the usability and relevance of the outcomes of research projects, thus strengthen the EDITB.

### **Introduce standards for the industry**

The countries and companies, which are going to participate in common projects, need to approve and recognize standards as common rules inside their businesses model. The main objective of the use of standards is to give countries and companies the chance to follow the same rules and to have access at some kind of technologies. The use standards will avoid incompatibilities and increases the quality of projects. The EDA should be responsible to draw and develop standards but also to supervise the implementation of the standards.

### **Common strategy for Security of Sources (SoS)**

The EU, including its Defense industry is for a large extend dependent on resources from outside the EU. Oil, gas, minerals including rare metals are quintessential for the production of advanced technological equipment. In order to facilitate the strengthening of the EDITB access to these sources should be ensured. The only way to achieve this is to align the interest of all member states and to define a common strategy for securing these sources.

## Conclusions

As we have seen before, there are several challenges for the defense of Europe from an industrial and technological perspective.

- If we make an effort putting together our technological base we will be able to combat the threats that Europe is facing in a better way, and to compete with the emerging economies in Asia and the new strategic priorities of the USA.
- We have to adapt our agreements for defense cooperation to the current situation of our capability needs, economic abilities, and to new concepts of defense.

The solutions we suggest are the following;

- EDA should become a more important player in enhancing the EDITB. A first step is to increase its budget and to extend their responsibilities.
- Not only defense companies, but also other stakeholders should be more involved in the process of strengthening the EDITB.
- Standards should be introduced to foster interoperability and to improve the usability of new technologies a system of systems.
- The last proposal for strengthening the EDTIB is to develop a common strategy for Security of Sources (SoS). Without secured access to sources, the EU and its industrial and technological base are no longer in the position to be competitive, innovative and able to face new threats.

To end, in order to strengthen the EDITB, we have to think in an optimistic way, where the countries of the EU have a common vision for the defense of Europe.

## The importance of the Mediterranean for the European Union

### Introduction

The Mediterranean forms the southern border of the European Union. It has been the home of the first civilizations of the European continent. In today's world, the Mediterranean forms both a border as a highway, allowing to defend the European Union as projection its power beyond the European continent. Looking at the Mediterranean as a border it brings with it problems in the field of immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism. Looking at the Mediterranean as an area for projection power, we notice that this area is currently an unstable area. The Arab Spring is raging at the borders of the European Union and the question still remains if the EU should intervene. There is also question if Turkey should be allowed in the Union or not. Both the pro and cons of letting Turkey join the EU brings both solutions as new security problems and brings with it the problem of resolving the situation with Cyprus. Last, the influence of the EU goes beyond the Mediterranean. Areas like the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the old European colonies are important both for our security as for our economy.

This paper tries to identify the threats this area poses to the security of the European Union and to give answers how to deal with these threats. Given the nature of this area multiple solutions to these threats are possible, some of them would fall outside what is written in this paper.

### 1. Geography of the Mediterranean

#### a. North versus South

By dividing the Mediterranean into a northern and southern area we can see that the Mediterranean forms a border. In the north we have the European Union while the southern part is made up by the different countries of North Africa. The Mediterranean also forms a border between a rich world in the north and a poor world in the south. This difference in economic wealth is the cause of the mass migration of people from North Africa to the European Union. The effects of this migration are the most visible on the Italian island of Lampedusa where thousands of refugees arrive every year. Despite the best efforts of the Italian coast guard and border services, they are unable to curb this migration. This migration is also visible at the area near the Strait of Gibraltar where there is migration from Marocco to Spain and also between north Africa and Malta. Although this migration

is less known throughout the European Union since the problems at Lampedusa are more reported in European news agencies. Likewise, there is a migration stream between Turkey and Greece that is in need of an urgent focus as Greek law enforcement agencies are hampered by the European budget cuts.

With the mass migration of people between the two continents we also see organized crime popping up. Smuggling and drug trafficking between Africa and the European Union are old news but they are still an important security problem for the Union. Well financed and well organized, with access to both European and African markets to get their equipment, the organized cartels are capable to adapt themselves to new security measures made by European law enforcement agencies, allowing them to stay ahead of the game. This forces the EU to keep adapting their strategies and tactics in this everlasting game of cat and mouse.

One type of these organized cartels are terrorist groups. Just like organized crime organizations, terrorist organizations are very well funded, highly adaptive and mostly ahead of the security forces. The most dangerous of these terrorist groups for the EU is the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). The AQIM has been responsible for several terrorist attacks both on the African as the European continent. It is not old news that their members infiltrate Europe through Spain, blending in with the local population. Once inside Spain, they are capable of traveling freely throughout the Shengen Zone.

Hence, we can see that the north versus south approach of the Mediterranean reveals security problems that are most related to the field of Law Enforcements. One of the major problems in countering migration, smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism across the Mediterranean is the sovereignty of the member states of the EU. By this, we mean that most member states are standing and acting alone while these problems affect the whole EU. A better cooperation between the member states in the field of law enforcement is needed. There is a need for a better integration of the several law enforcement and border guard services of the involved member states. Joint task forces, legally capable of operation in each others territorial waters, could be one solution. A full sharing of all the information between member states would allow faster and better action of the law enforcement agencies.

A common juridical system with uniform law, and more important, uniform punishments in all the member states are also a solution. The problem with the different national laws is that they envision different punishments for the same

crimes. This forces criminal organizations to shift their activities to the member state with the weakest punishment.

We must also realize that the countries at our frontier are our border states. They are the buffer to our heartland. A Shengen zone with free movements of goods and peoples sounds good but the Shengen zone is a dangerous system concerning European security. Once the border has been crossed or breached, free travel is allowed. By excluding the border states from the Shengen zone, we would be capable to create a second border for our security, namely the borders between our border states and heartland states. We are not suggesting a whole exclusion of the countries. In this system we are proposing persons would just have an identity check by means of their driver licenses or identity cards, and not with special passports. Since illegal immigrants do not have these papers, they can be intercepted at this new border easily.

Finally, the EU should try to project soft power into the countries of northern Africa. By promoting and securing both economical and political stability as well as human security. As for instance reinforcing and bolstering the law enforcement services of those countries, the EU would manage to decrease the above mentioned problems. If we could stop these security problems in their countries of origin, we would need less measures of our own to protect the EU.

#### b. West versus East

Looking at the western part of the Mediterranean we see a strong representation of European forces in this area. The western part includes Spain, France and Italy. The eastern part is only represented by Greece and Cyprus. Both these countries are in an economic crisis, forcing them to downsize their armed forces, thereby decreasing the presence of the EU in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Today, this eastern part is forming the most important part of the Mediterranean. The Syrian civil war, the unresolved situation of Cyprus, the presence of a Russian fleet and the Egyptian control over the Suez canal that is the European gate for its overseas trade with Asia are all important security issues for the EU.

There is a need to shift military forces from the calm western part towards the military and politically more important eastern part. The best way would be the creation of an European Mediterranean fleet. This fleet would be free to operate in each others waters and making use of each others ports freely without the need for diplomatic clearances. This fleet would be allowed to position itself in any crisis area within the Mediterranean, acting both as a deterrent as an enforcing factor for backing up the EU political power.

Important for this fleet would be standardization of the military equipment. With standardized ships, planes and weapons, we would make maintenance easier and have a clear and direct view of the capabilities of the military equipment. As an example we would like to point out the FREMM frigate program between France and Italy. It was envisioned that both countries would end up with the same type of frigates, however, further specification of these ships happened on national level, allowing for differences between French and Italian FREMM frigates.

## 2. The unstable eastern Mediterranean

### a. The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring caught the EU, and the whole world, by surprise. However, even after the first days and weeks, we saw the EU still unprepared. The EU had no plans envisioning the mass migration of Libyans and Tunisians from their countries, thereby overwhelming mainly the Italian coast guard and law enforcement agencies. The EU neither envisioned the possibility that radical islam elements within its own population would take up arms and fight in both Libya and Syria. The EU still hasn't a solution for the problem these fighters could cause once they return to the EU.

The Arab Spring also showed that the EU lacks the military power to back up its foreign policy. This was clearly made visible in the opening hours of the NATO intervention in Libya. It was clearly that the EU would be in charge of this intervention and that the US would not be involved. Still, the EU needed to rely on the US warships and submarines to deliver a mass attack with Tomahawk cruise missiles to make the first breaches in the Libyan air defense before the air offensive could begin.

This shows that despite the large defense industry in the EU we are still dependent on US military hardware in several crucial fields. This was true in the field of ship based cruise missiles for land targets during the Libyan operation although the French are now developing these missiles for their own ships.

Also the lack of aircraft carriers was noted during the Libyan operations. For the time, the French carrier Charles de Gaulle is the only operational carrier in the EU. It will be several years before the 2 British carriers of the Queen Elizabeth class will be operational, bringing the amount of carriers up to three.

The lack of aircraft carriers hampered air operations above Libya. Land based aircraft operation as far out as Greece needed a long transit time towards their target area. This caused for a low amount of daily air strikes and a long reaction time to strike important targets. Ship based aircraft had the advantage to take of several miles from the Libyan coast, allow a higher frequency in sorties and a faster response time.

#### b. The Syrian civil war

For more than a year, there is a strong urge in the west to intervene in the Syrian civil war. Recently both France as the UK were prepared for an intervention on their own but backed down from this.

A crucial factor for the lack of intervention are the Russian forces patrolling the Syrian coast. Although they are officially there to execute an evacuation of Russian citizens in Syria, should this be required, these Russian forces also act as a deterrent. It is no secret that the Russians favor the Assad regime and are against any aid that could tip the balance in favor for the rebels. The major question is whether or not the Russians are willing to intervene in the conflict on the side of Assad once the EU intervenes on the side of the rebels. We should ask ourselves if we are first willing to provoke the Russians by intervening in Syria and second, if we have the necessary forces of our own to deter any Russian reaction.

#### c. Egypt

The events in Egypt should be of concern for the EU. Free access of the Suez Canal is paramount for our economy. The import of oil and our bilateral trade with Asia depends of access through the Suez Canal. Granted that the chance of another Suez crisis or closure of the Canal are very small we would still benefit the most of a political stable Egypt. Indeed, we would benefit the most with a pro-western or a neutral leader in Egypt.

It was no secret that former Egyptian president Morsi increased Egyptian ties with Iran, even allowing Iranian warships to sail into the Mediterranean Sea. Giving the rising tensions concerning the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian warships in the Mediterranean can form a security risk. It would allow any conflict between the west and Iran to be spilled over straight to Europe's southern borders.

### 3. The Turkey problem

Turkey is currently a rising economic power and for years a very important regional power. Its economical rise allows for a modernization and expansion of its armed forces. This is clearly seen in its naval forces with the building of new modern frigates. Turkey's long history has always been connected with Europe, rather than with its neighboring countries. Allowing Turkey to join the EU would have several benefits. Foremost we would gain strong military forces that will bolster the EU presences within the eastern Mediterranean.

However, there are several disadvantages with allowing Turkey full membership. These are all in the field of border security. We would gain borders with the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria. We would see grave problems concerning the fields of immigration, drug trafficking through Iran and terrorist infiltration from both the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Since these new borders are all in mountainous areas with poor infrastructure and low population it would be extremely difficult to keep these new borders closed or under complete surveillance. Giving Turkey full membership would create more security problems rather than solving them.

Turkey's entry in the EU is also tied with the fate of Cyprus. Without a peaceful reunification of the northern and southern part of Cyprus, an uneasy stand off between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey exists. Since Greece and Cyprus still hold an important vote for allowing Turkey in, any reunification will have to happen on Greece's and Cyprus's terms, something that Turkey would reject immediately.

Cyprus thus still remains a dormant conflict that still holds within it the potential to erupt. Should the Cyprus conflict evolve into a war, we would find ourselves against a state backed up by Turkey. We must ask ourselves if we are willing to confront Turkey, a fellow NATO member in such a worst case scenario. It is in the best interests of the EU to keep the status quo at Cyprus or find a peaceful solution that is acceptable to both Greece and Turkey. But without a solution for Cyprus, any membership of Turkey in the EU is likely to be out of the question. The recent discovery of the new found gas fields in the area are also a source of a potential conflict between Turkey, Israel and Cyprus.

#### 4. Looking beyond the Mediterranean

Does the security of the EU stops at the Mediterranean? The answer to that is definitely no. The one truth in security affairs is that intelligence is power. Knowing what is

happening and what actors are involved allows the EU to give an appropriate response. This is why the EU should reach out as far as possible. The further our presence and influence, the better we can spot a crisis that could harm EU interests. The main question we have to ask is just how far does the EU have to reach out. Several key regions are already defined.

EU involvement stretches all the way into Africa where several EU missions have been and still are taking place. It is clear that our security interests are beyond the Mediterranean. Even without the approval of the EU, member states still have the freedom to intervene on their own if they want. This was the case for Mali, where the French government decided to assist the Malian government by direct military action. France still holds the right to aid his former colonies even if their value is limited for the EU. Still, by attacking AQIM terrorists in Mali, the French forces prevented these terrorists from creating a safe base in Mali from which terrorist attacks could be planned and trained. In this way, the French intervention does contribute to the European security although this is not overtly visible.

Another key area for the EU is the Sahel region. As mentioned earlier, the Mali conflict saw AQIM terrorist trying to overthrow the Mali state and setting up a Muslim state. Such failed states could become a new Afghanistan in that way that it becomes a base area for terrorists. Knowing that AQIM has already carried out attacks in the EU, we can not allow such states to be created. This security issue was however not seen by the EU council and forced France to operate on its own without an EU mandate.

Several years ago, the EU decided to intervene in Tchad, more notably the Darfur region to protect refugees from armed gangs operating out of Sudan. Although our security was not at stake the EU decided to intervene in order to promote stability and peace. It was clear to the EU at that time that the EU would benefit the most from a stable Sahel region.

Nigeria is also a country that should deserve the attention of the EU. First, its oil reserves could be used to enhance our energy supplies. The piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea are also visible in front of the Nigerian coast. These activities could disrupt our trading routes with western Africa although these are of lesser importance than our trading routes in the Indian Ocean. Last but not least, Nigeria is also the home of terrorist organization called Boko Haram. Although Boko Haram is fighting a domestic war against Christians in Nigeria we should make ourselves no illusions. The fact remains that Boko Haram has ties with Al Qaeda. These

ties are informal at the moment but if they are to be strengthened we would see Boko Haram target more westerns working in Nigeria.

The most important action in Africa concerning our security is the EURNAVFOR Atalanta mission at the Horn of Africa. Here, in this remote area, local pirate gangs have shown that they are able to disrupt and influence our commercial trade with Africa and our energy supplies from the Middle East. It clearly shows that small events in far off places can have the potential of influencing our security if we leave them unattended.

The Atalanta operation is also important for several other reasons. It is the first time that a large amount of European ships from different member states are operating in the same operation without the NATO framework that is normally keeping our armies together in these kind of operations. Indeed, the Atalanta operation allows us to take the first steps of operating all together without having the political problems from the member states about questioning operational control and rules of engagement. The experience that the EU is currently gaining with the Atalanta operation can be used in the future for integrating the armed forces of the member states into one organization.

The Horn of Africa is not the only place where piracy is having an influence on our trade. The Gulf of Guinea is also an area that has a large pirate activity. Although this area knows less trade than the Horn of Africa region and is therefore of less strategic importance, the EU should not demise this area. Pirate gangs are more violent in this area than they are in the Horn of Africa. The risk of casualties and even the number of deaths is higher. One should also take into account the large oil fields in front of Nigeria. Securing our interests in this area could enhance our energy security for the near future.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is the most important maritime region for the EU. The IOR holds our energy supply lines coming from the Middle-East, more notably the Persian Gulf. It also holds our trading routes with the Asian continent. This explains why the EU is willing to intervene in the IOR, more notably the Horn of Africa region, and not in the Gulf of Guinea. But just how far into the IOR should we operate? Should we reach out as far as the island of La Réunion as the French would like? We should also take into account the rising power of India and their claims on the IOR. Can we allow ourselves to turn the jurisdiction over the IOR over to India and let them solve our problems? We can not allow to step back from this region since it is far to

important. A deep co-operation with India however allows us to create a more secure region that is both in our interests as in India's interests.

And what to do with the Persian Gulf? While tensions between Iran, the United States, Israel and the other Gulf states keep on rising, we have to take into account that the Iranian threats of closing the Strait of Hormuz is also a threat to the EU. Our dependence on the oil from the Middle East is far too important to just stand by idle. The EU has back ups for its energy like oil from the North Sea and the energy trade with Russia. Still, a conflict between Iran, the Gulf countries, Israel and the United States will have its consequences for the EU. Even if our trade is not disrupted, the conflict would have oil prices rising, creating pressure on our economy.

All the above mentioned examples make it clear that our sphere of influence stretch out and compromise Africa. It is obvious that the EU should have a better co-operation with African nations. First there is the moral point. EU member states should still be concerned with what happens in their former colonies. It is in the EU best interests that we create and maintain stable African states. The training of police and armed forces, tackling corruption and enhancing the judicial system are several operations in the area of soft power that make a whole world of difference in Africa. But the EU should not be afraid of using hard power and act and fight rebel organizations that are aimed to overthrow stable African states.

Our co-operation with Africa also has an economic point of view. Africa still holds massive amounts of resources that could be used to feed our industries and keep our economy running. Being able to exploit these resources would secure our economy for the next decades. The African markets on the other end of the spectrum play a vital role as export markets for European products.

## 5. Conclusions

The importance of the Mediterranean can be viewed from different points of view. Looking at this area from north to south it forms the southern border of the EU. As such we should be vigilant concerning our border security. Immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism are all threats for the EU. Better cooperation between the member states and one legal system as well as a revision of the Shengen Zone could help in curbing these problems. At the same time stabilization of the countries on the North African coast

and helping their law enforcement agencies would add another layer of defense against these problems.

Looking from west to east we see an uneven balance of resources. The EU has powerful military forces in the western part but we are weak in the eastern part. The recent events like the Arab Spring show us that it is exactly this eastern part that needs the most attention. An unified European fleet in this area, a kind of Mediterranean fleet, would be a solution for this area. A fleet, under unified command and with free access to each other territorial waters and ports would enhance operations. This fleet would also enhance the military power that backs up the EU foreign policy.

The Arab Spring has shown just how unprepared the EU is to cope with sudden events. The lack of military hardware in several fields still keep the EU depended on the United States. Work must be done to close this gap and develop our own capabilities.

Turkey holds the key of solving our lack of influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Making Turkey an EU member would however mean borders with the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Given the geographic nature of this new border it would create severe problems in both the fields of immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Even if we would make Turkey a full member, a long term solution for Cyprus has to be found and this has to be a solution that is acceptable for both Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.

Finally, the Mediterranean is the EU southern border but the EU security doesn't stop there. The IOR, the Horn of African and the Sahel region are important areas for the security of the EU. It is the EU interests of being as involved as we can in these regions. The further from home we could handle and solve problems and conflicts, the less likely they become a major problem to the European society. This could best be done by cooperating with African states and creating stable states.

Finally, the European sphere of influence is being compromised in the African continent. We not only have the duty to be involved in Africa on a military level, that is to fight rebel forces aiming to overthrow stable states but also on the economic level. Africa could deliver the resources needed for our economy and create economic security for the EU. While at the same time African markets can become important export markets for European products.

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**Vth Young Europeans EuroDefence Conference**

# The future of European society : Risks and opportunities

*Working Group 10*

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## Introduction

In December 2012, the Atlantic Council (a Washington DC based think tank with major influence on US positions related to global affairs) issued a report entitled *“Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World”*, which aimed at identifying main challenges for the US at the global level in the 20 coming years. The identified issues are strategic for the US as they have direct implications for their positions in a multipolar (or a-polar) world.

On the other side of the Atlantic ocean, such an exercise of prospective has not been realised yet and is not foreseen in the coming months. Recently, European debates have been entirely and exclusively focused on the resolution of the so called “Eurocrisis”. If the future and the sustainability of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are clearly of utmost importance, the European Union (EU) should not focused only on its own troubles and should also keep an eye on the evolution of the world in which it evolves and is enshrined.

### **Recommendation for EU policies**

- The EU should have at its disposal a prospective and strategic direction, which should provides European rulers with independents analysis on current and future challenges for the EU. The current Bureau of European Political Advisers (BEPA) could usefully see its mandate broadened and its means enhanced.
- The realization of a thorough analysis of what could be the role of the EU in 10 to 20 years, on the model of the report of the Atlantic Council, should then the first task of such an organism.

The objective of this report is to propose a first assessment of some of the challenges such a report should tackle. Bearing in mind, the general objective of ensuring the security of European citizens and interests worldwide, we decided to adopt a comprehensive approach in order to focus not only on purely military (or national security-related) issues, but to integrate political, social, economic, climatic factors that could have a direct or indirect impact on EU security and stability in the short / medium / long terms.

The ambition of this report is not to be exhaustive but to propose some reflection lines and policy recommendations for the EU rulers.

## Climate change

Climate change is happening: temperature is rising, rain patterns are changing, glaciers and snow are melting and the global sea level is rising. These changes are expected to continue and extreme weather events resulting in hazards such as floods and droughts will be more frequent and intense. The global temperature has risen by about 0.8° over the past 150 years, and is projected to increase even more which raises the risk of dangerous changes for global human and natural ecosystems. Some European regions are already particularly vulnerable to climate change: Southern Europe and Mediterranean basin (increase in heat waves and droughts), Mountains areas (increase of melting snow and ice), Coastal zones, deltas and flood (sea level rises, intense rainfall, floods and storms), Europe's far north and Arctic (increase of temperatures and melting ice),...

While United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has recognized the goal to limit the global mean temperature, appropriate means to achieve such an objective are still uncertain. Policies and efforts are necessary to reduce emissions in an effective way, even though climate changes are to be inevitable. The preparation for a greater range of temperature increase and other climate changes are important such as start thinking and dealing with risks and hazards, that are uncertain and complex and that require Europeans to cooperate, to learn from each other and to invest in the long-term transformations needed to sustain our well-being in the face of climate change.

Measures such as technological and engineering projects, green ecosystem-based approaches using nature, and so-called soft measures (e.g. governance approaches to help communities cope with risks) are possible solutions to this challenge.

This must be done in a coherent way through its integration in EU and national policies. There is still uncertainty in climate change projections and it is difficult to accurately estimate the future risks as socio-economic aspects are also changing, for these reasons these measures should be flexible enough to cope with unforeseen circumstances and a range of future climate.

This carries a cost, but doing nothing would be more expensive in the long term. Moreover, investing in the green technologies that cut emissions will also boost the economy; create jobs and strengthen Europe's competitiveness.

### Identified risks and opportunities:

Impacts and vulnerabilities for nature, the economy and our health differ across regions, territories and economic sectors in Europe. Some risks we are facing with this challenge of climate change are: climate refugees, shortage of food and water, spread of infectious diseases which affect human health and the impact in a negatively way of: tourism and infrastructure in general.

- **Climate-caused migration** is currently a manageable problem, but in a long term it could spiral out of control. The term "climate refugees," is used in connection with those displaced due to climate problems. The estimates for the number of those displaced by climate vary widely. According to the Institute for Environment and Human Security, the number was as high as 50 million in 2010 and 150 million people may by 2050. But the hardest question to answer it's what to do for them. A big legal gap exists when environmentally displaced migrants cross national borders. Since these migrants are not considered refugees they have no legal protection. At the same time, it is unclear which international organizations should

take the lead on the cause. Climate refugees are a difficult problem for governments and policy-makers due to the variety of environmental disasters that can have a lot of impacts.

- **Food shortage.** Food inflation is here and it's here to stay. We can see it getting worse every time we buy groceries, basic food. Wheat, corn, soybeans, and rice have been skyrocketing to record highs. These sustained price increases will continue as food production shortfalls, and it is likely that it continues to get worse and eventually become a full-scale global food crisis. The extreme weather is the main contributing factor to the growing food shortage. However, commodity speculation has also been targeted as one of the culprits.
- **Water shortage.** Water is life, sustaining ecosystems and regulating our climate. But it's a finite resource and Europe needs to learn the value of one of its most precious resources. Competition for water poses a growing risk to the economy, communities and the ecosystems. If climate change keeps raising average temperatures across Europe, water is expected to become even scarcer in many areas.

#### **Policy recommendations:**

- Climate refugees: the setting up of an international framework / forum to tackle the issues of climate refugees should be promoted by the EU at the global level.
- Integration of climate change related objectives / constraints in EU trade policies (which would be balanced by enhanced competitiveness proofing of the policies) would enable to better implement UN resolutions and international frameworks / agreements.
- Measures to encourage the efficient use of water include penalties for excessive consumption and discounts for water saving are important, such as promotion of sustainable agriculture (crops using less water, more efficient irrigation etc), development of alternative water supply infrastructures, water efficient technologies (encouraging research on this area).

## **Global security architecture**

### **1. Proliferation of Chemical Weapons, nuclear weapons, IT weapons (Stuxnet)**

The proliferation of weapons in the whole world such as nuclear, chemical, biological or unmanned aerial vehicles and the access to electronics from anywhere, with the knowledge of this technologies by terrorists, obligates the European community to establish an accurate control of the main sensitive sources to these weapons. The EU should be concerned about the outcome of the Syrian conflict. Syria possesses chemical weapons and there is a high risks that when the rebels would overthrow the current regime, Al'Qaeda could use the chemical weapons in terrorist attacks in the EU. Al'Qaeda has not ratified the Chemical Weapons convention, thus the OPCW could not use its mandate. In addition there is the risk of Iran and North-Korea possessing nuclear weapons. The control of the income minerals for weapons and also the management of the residual ones has to be in account to avoid this proliferation in bad hands.

IT Weapons is also a vulnerable point in our society. The control of the internal and external relationships and those of the organisations are crucial. The social engineering is a reality and lots of the information can be observed by people whose intentions are not legal.

To show the gravity of the problem with viruses in critical structures, stuxnet virus attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities. This kind of situations can't be happened again neither in EU nor the rest of the world.

#### **Policy recommendations**

- Focus on a stronger relation with Asian countries, that are developing more IT weapons, or viruses to carry out cyber attacks and keep a closer relationship is needed. Not only to control their activity, but also to share information and take a different point of view of the main problems and mistakes of the systems.
- Control the main European servers to not be exposed to massive cyber attacks. Establishing a proportional flux of information in order to not collapse the system and isolate it if possible.

## **2. Cyber Crime**

Coordinated global cyber attacks are on the rise and there is a high threat that with cyber attacks complete societies within Europe can be pulled apart (e.g. cyber attack on Estonia). The risks of cyber crime are immense, not only for the economic, military and public facilities of the state but also for individual people. The adoption by the US of strategy for the protection of cyberspace as part of their "homeland security strategy" should be the opportunity for the EU and NATO to establish a legal and common strategy to combat cyber crime and cyber war

#### **Policy recommendations**

- Invest in R&D of solutions aiming at the protection of the integrity and the enhancement of resilience of the European communication system.
- International agreements aiming at the prevention and repression of cyber attacks should be a political priority of the EU in its relationships with its strategic allies. A solid legal framework about cyber space and a new global legal mechanism against global cyber attacks is important to bring perpetrators to justice. The EU and NATO do not yet recognize cyber attacks as military attacks, and therefore Article 5 cannot be applied. It could be proposed to include the attacks perpetrated by States in the scope of this article, to blame authors of this crimes and show the consequences to the rest of the countries. These cyber attacks not only affect to the military to the main institutions, but also to companies and great producers of energy and goods.
- A European Cybercrime Centre should be set up, with the objective to define a strategy, to produce assessments of cyber threats, including trend analyses and forecasts as well as new developments on the ways cybercriminals operate. Close cooperation between private sector, research community, civil society, academia, Eurojust and organisms that avoid the proliferation of free attacks from all around the world.

## **3. Neighbourhood Security**

If we look to the recent events that have been taking place around the world in the last years, we notice the trend invading every country, which is leading to an even more active participation of the population of those countries in the matters that affect them directly, and that is creating an

instability in all the foreign affairs politics of everyone. The main example is the Arab Spring, and all the revolts that keep occurring along the North of Africa and all the Arab countries, with no regard of how civilized they are or the structure leading those countries. We should have our main concern looking at the situation in the Sahel and the Maghreb, being more precise, in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and the countries of the like.

The influence of social movements in Europe against the governments, the financial system, and the vulnerability of justice, that are a reflect of those happening in the countries mentioned before are the ones that will define the decisions made to correct the path of Europe.

An overall security or defence strategy is necessary to become a strategic player, because the challenges that keep appearing and piling in front of the European Union are not for the countries to be faced alone, because their resolution and consequences affect everyone of them. Currently there is a lack of long term perspective, being the way of dealing with the problems in the neighbourhood are too narrow minded and focused only in patching the problem for the time, but with no permanent solution in sight for them.

It's in our common strategic interest to make the external policy of the EU consistent and to adapt a EU foreign policy strategy that underlines external action and global issues.

#### **4. Defence Budgets**

Due to the financial crises and public opinion defence budgets have shrunk massively. Cuts in military budgets threaten Europe's position as a strategic player and the relations with allies such as the United States of America.

A threat is that the USA will shift its priorities more to Asia. The EU should adapt its objectives to the rest of the allies and also require them to support ours.

#### **Policy recommendations:**

- Increase EDA's Pooling and Sharing and NATO's Smart Defence initiatives, in order to share and to cooperate with capabilities. Standardization of means and personnel would be necessary also to optimize resources, investments and time, which are crucial to the coordination.
- Restructure investments to give priority to external security. Bearing in mind that the US is dedicating 4.8% of its GDP to defence expenses, the collective commitment taken by EU member States (during December 2008 European Council) to dedicate 2% of the EU GDP to defence should be implemented through an adaptation of European Semester rules and regulations.

## **Democratic accountability and sustainability within the EU**

Since its creation, the EU and its member states promote the respect of the Human Rights, state of law, solidarity and in this way, the security of the European citizenships. However, problems at local, regional and national levels are growing up and becoming problems at the European level. Corruption, economic crisis, and the raise of nationalisms are progressively turning European citizens

suspicious about the credibility and the quality of their governments, administrations and especially concerning to EU institutions.

Therefore, one of the biggest issues is the raise of nationalism and how this problem can call into question these European values, especially those values that concern the common European culture and society. Nationalism have contributed to the formation, survival as well as the dismemberment (e.g. former Yugoslavia) of states. It would appear, at first sight that the correlation between these two processes is sometimes of a causal nature. That is to say that in some cases, nationalism is the manifestation of democratic pluralism taken to its extreme in the negative sense and at other times nationalism is the expression of social opposition to the lack of democracy.

The most common problems concerning to this subject involve problems of national identity, territorial control, the relationship between governors and the governed, and the problems of organizing individuals for the achievement of common purposes, that is to say, the use of the power from the powerful to the powerless. In this way, if the European Union wants remain a relevant step for its citizen, it is necessary to find a solution for this threat, both for the European citizens and project, and for the locals of those countries or regions.

For instance, decisions taken within the framework of the European Semester aim at ensuring the sustainability of the EMU through a necessary coordination of budgetary and economic policies. However, the implications of decisions taken by the European Council on proposal of the Commission can involve sometimes radical reforms with painful effects for EU citizens. Due to the lack of implication of European and national parliaments in this process, the legitimacy of these decisions are potentially fiercely questionable. The insufficient social acceptance and democratic control of these decisions could throw a discredit on policies decided within this framework and on institutions themselves.

#### **Policies recommendations**

- A better implication of European and national parliaments in the process of the European Semester is inevitable to strengthen the legitimacy of decisions and policies adopted within this framework. This strengthening would be a clear first step towards a more democratic, and so, more sustainable Union as it would enable to shift main European debates from an institution-based approach to a policy-based approach.
- European Union could also usefully create stability in Europe and beyond its borders, both through the enlargement process as well as through a well formulated European Neighbourhood Policy with the aim of enhancing prosperity in these countries and thus, the security of the European Union. For this, EU should use a human security approach (i.e. an approach more focused on the security of individuals rather than the security of states) and for this, we need a domestic emergency service at global level and this would include “both civilian and military capabilities”. Civilians to better understand the locals and an international military cooperation not to impose its rules but because in this way those organizations and states could share high-cost services saving some resources which can be used in other problems.

## European economy in a new globalized world

It is generally acknowledged that the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the subsequent creation of the EEC (now the EU) have been a clear driver of European collective stability through the setting up of an economic framework aiming at creating interdependencies between Member States economies and providing prosperity and stability to their citizens.

Given the still strong (but converging) heterogeneity of European economies, societies and interests, economic, social and political stability is still a major contribution of the EU to the maintaining of a European collective security. The financial, economic and budgetary crisis the EU (more especially the Eurozone) is currently experiencing threatens, in the short run, this stability and, in the medium run, Europe's security.

Moreover, the European economic model is currently challenged by the deep transformation of global economic context and organization, which impacts directly the activities of European businesses (even defence and security industry). The accelerated rise of new competitive and attractive territories (e.g. so called BRICS countries), and the enhanced globalization of value chains are challenging European positions at the global level.

This challenge in the short and medium term is mainly two-folds:

- Internal: how can we achieve timely the further integration necessary to tackle structural imbalance within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a spirit of responsibility and solidarity?
- External: how can we adapt our economic, social and industrial structures to the new characteristics and trends of global economy and trade?

It is more and more obvious that a way out of the so-called "Euro-crisis" which would not take into account these evolutions would not be sustainable and, so, would be doomed to fail. The ability of the EU to remain a driver of growth and prosperity for European Member States and citizens and to remain relevant at the global level is at stake.

This challenge, if not tackled appropriately by the EU and its Member States, would potentially triggers **risks for European security** in the short / medium / long run

- The absence of solutions to major structural imbalances within the EMU is to enhance the effects of the observed polarization of EU industry around Germany and Northern Europe and deindustrialization of Southern Europe. The sustainability of the EMU model would then be more and more questioned and an exit (more or less anticipated) of the Eurozone would become ineluctable. A long period of economic and political instability would then be probable.
- Alternatively, the design of a structural solution within the EMU which would not take into account (notably through EU trade policy) the most recent evolutions of global trade patterns would not provoke the expected results in terms of growth and jobs creation. This failure, as it would most probably follow huge sacrifices from European population, would then enhance defiance against EU and Member States institutions. Moreover, the EU would then see its positions on global markets weakened. Finally, the EU would become less and less relevant at the global level.

A mitigation of these risks should be a major concerns for EU (and national) rulers when it comes to the design of new EU policies and planned reforms.

Given Conversely, this major challenge could be the opportunity for the EU to strengthen its positions on global markets and to remain at the centre of global trade.

- Given the necessary fiscal consolidation within the EMU, it is clear that exports towards non-EU countries will become more and more strategic for the EU, its Member States and its businesses. The integration of this concern in the design of new EU policies would then enable the EU to develop a true strategy to improve and better secure its access to emerging fast-growing markets.
- The integration of this concern in policy design would then probably give the opportunity for the EU to be at the centre of reforms of the global economic governance, notably through enhanced and privileged relationships with BRICS countries. The experience acquired by Europe during the current crisis would then most probably an asset at the global level to the building of global solutions to transnational issues. This central position would certainly enable the EU to exports its standards and norms worldwide.

#### **Policy recommendations**

- The design of a true industrial strategy at the EU level addressing both internal and external dimensions is absolutely necessary to tackle efficiently the identified challenge. Such a policy would have to focus on high value-added industrial activities and should take into account differentiated approaches for northern and southern Europe, the importance and composition of global value chains and the global strategies of EU main partners.
- A true acknowledgement of the current and future role of BRICS countries at the global level would enable the EU to remain relevant in the long term, when it comes to world affairs. This acknowledgment should be implemented through all EU external (trade, security cooperation, development, neighborhood) and internal policies (e.g. R&D strategy, industrial cooperation). For instance, the broadening of the transatlantic relationship to southern America and western Africa countries would certainly strengthen it and would create a relevant forum to tackle transnational issues (e.g. drug traffics).
- Finally, the definition of the security of trade routes and EU export capabilities as a common strategic interest would make sense and enable a consistent approach of global affairs by the EU.

## Management of vital and critical dependencies

It is a fact that our nations have built themselves over the continuous draining of the natural resources provided by our planet, and we grow clearly and greatly dependent on those resources, because they sustain our lifestyle. But it is just the way things have worked since the human race started living inside a society. The societies build themselves around a core consistent on the insurance of the well being of their members, and to provide that welfare it needs to consume just so it can produce.

But we are affording too much risks in this terrain, because we are sustaining our economy and, just to be more accurate, our production, including all aspects involved in the production, because we are treating raw materials coming to us from countries all over the world, mainly the north of Africa, South America and Far Asia, which provide us with a constant supply of cheap resources, but are deemed too unstable and always under the peril of being cut in any moment; and to move and coordinate the processing of all that material we have built facilities with the technology provided to us by other countries, such as China, Korea or Japan, that are our allies, but it creates an obvious dependence on the maintenance and spare parts made by them, so that also is a strain on our economy and independence.

Also, most of those resources come to us trough the north of Africa, and in a time of what seems a continuous source of revolts and uprisings, even leaving the countries in the brink of civil war, that is a really great risk we are facing, because we depend on those supply lines in order to have an efficient distribution of, mainly, natural gas and petrol, and we are always in peril of having those irreplaceable streams cut because of that instability. We also depend on the resources coming from countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Iran, which, in the first case, are our allies and have a really occidental-orientated mind, but will clearly ally themselves with the rest of the Arab countries in case of conflict; and in the second case, those countries are the spark with the highest probability of igniting the fire of war, that leading to the end of the deals with occident with the petrol and the energetic resources we so much need.

The other face of the problem is the so narrow minded view we have in Europe, in the way of the trust we give to other energy resources, giving the most of it to the nuclear energy, and allowing so few credit to the clean energies, thinking that they are not enough to depend in them only. That leave us with the problem that we have also to dispose of the products of the nuclear plants, speaking of not only the radioactive metals, but also the water, which is a critical resource mentioned before.

We have a lot of clear decisions to make in the future, if we want to reach a solution for those dependencies we now assume and allow. We are not seeing that we are offered continuously a lot of opportunities to solve our problems and lead our policies towards an improved production, free of those needs and dependences, with new sources and resources.

### **Policy recommendations**

- In a short and midterm way: the menace of the restrains in our supply routes, and the flowing of the resources from the countries in where they are extracted; and the best thing to immediately do is to guide our foreign affairs policies in ensuring the security of supply of Europe and to prevent disruptions of value chains, the stability of trading conditions of these

resources, the maintaining of stability in those areas with the means necessary, involving those from the guided negotiations and signing of trade agreements to the direct intervention in the places which are critical to the safety of the goods provided. That does not mean necessarily to develop an aggressive politic but to move towards the safety and stability of our necessities.

- But the most important solution, and the one that will produce its results in a very long term path is the develop of what should be the future of Europe as an entity, the renewable energies, which will produce a whole lot of clean energy, cutting ourselves from the dependence of resources, do not require the processing of any material, and would boost our economy in the way of releasing the restraint of the dealings with delicate, if not dangerous, countries such as Iran or China. The point is to develop our own technology and methods for the production, so we are not dependent in any way to the technology or replacements from anyone, allowing us to even have the opportunity of export those investigations and lead the way in all the world in that market. It is a very difficult thing to do in times of restraint, but to give to our greatest minds the opportunity and budget required to improve and develop is the best way to boost our economy, and keep growing as a common unity, if we adopt the project under the European Union flag.